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This thesis examines the congressional budgetary oversight exercised 
by Congress for the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) Satellite 
Communications System acquisition program during Fiscal Years 1982-1995. 
Authorization and appropriation defense bills for these years are reviewed for 
their insight into how and why the four Defense Committees exercised their 
budgetary oversight. The MILSTAR program generated significant 
congressional debate and was nearly terminated. The program was 
significantly restructured as a consequence of decisions made by the Defense 
Committees. These four Defense Committees are examined throughout the 
budget oversight process to identify their specific roles. The research indicates 
that the Defense Committees sometimes acted in unison with respect to 
MILSTAR and sometimes acted independently. No one committee 
consistently opposed or supported MILSTAR. The research also indicates that 
the appropriation committees exercised as much or more oversight authority 
as the authorizing committees. Another conclusion is that DOD could have 
been more pro-active in assessing and restructuring MILSTAR's mission 
during the shift from a Cold War to a Post-Cold War threat environment, 
especially during a period of shrinking defense dollars. The final conclusion 
is that the joint acquisition management structure for MILSTAR brought 
forth new DOD joint acquisition funding allocation problems, as the Services 
who generated the demand for MILSTAR system requirements did not 
necessarily have a corresponding role in paying for them. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States military buildup in the early and mid 1980's brought 
forth several new military acquisition programs for the Department of 
Defense (DOD). These programs were motivated by a threat from a nation 
that President Ronald Reagan had labeled an "evil empire." During most of 
this decade, the Cold War with the "evil empire/' the Soviet Union, was 
alive and well.  [Endnote 1, p. 140] 
Today's global climate is drastically different. The Soviet Union has 
collapsed, the Berlin Wall has been leveled, and the U. S. now finds itself 
trying to define the threat from a very ambiguous environment in which 
there is no major threat to replace the Soviets. There are however, many 
potential regional conflicts which could significantly tax U. S. military 
capabilities. The DOD challenge today is to continue still needed acquisition 
programs that were originally designed to counter the Soviet threat, modify 
where appropriate, and then justify them to a skeptical Congress which sees 
the reduced threat as an opportunity to advance more domestic programs 
over less obvious defense acquisitions. 
This thesis examines one such DOD acquisition program that evolved 
from the risk of nuclear war. Its conception concerned how our National 
Command Authority and strategic military leaders would continue to 
communicate after nuclear war had begun. The answer came with a new 
satellite communications system that was specifically designed to survive and 
operate after a Soviet anti-satellite nuclear attack. That system is the Military 
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) Satellite Communications System. 
The MILSTAR acquisition program is fighting an up-hill battle. Given 
a shrinking fiscal environment and no major military threat, the Department 
of Defense must explore how it will present this program to a Congress that is 
continuously searching for means to cut DOD funding. 
This thesis, entitled, "Congressional Budget Oversight of the Military 
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) Satellite Communications System 
Program, Fiscal Years 1982 to 1995," will research how Congress in its 
budgetary oversight role has impacted this acquisition program. It examines 
the issues, important committees and subcommittees, and the implications 
for the MILSTAR program due to congressional involvement in its 
acquisition process. The thesis is written as an instructional tool or guide to 
assist individuals in the acquisition field to better understand how Congress 
interacts and affects DOD acquisitions, especially high-profile, space-related 
ones such as MILSTAR. 
A.       AREA OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will analyze the role that Congress has played in the 
MILSTAR acquisition program and how the legislative process has impacted 
MILSTAR's acquisition since its beginning in 1982 to the present. The primary 
research question within this thesis is: How has Congress in its budgetary 
oversight role impacted the MILSTAR Satellite Communications System 
acquisition program? The subsidiary research questions within this thesis are: 
1. What are the primary issues affecting MILSTAR that have been 
addressed by the Congress? 
2. Which congressional committees and subcommittees have played 
the major roles in the conduct of budgetary oversight of MILSTAR? 
3. To what extent have these committees and subcommittees played in 
the MILSTAR acquisition? 
4. How is this congressional budgetary oversight affecting and re- 
structuring the MILSTAR program? 
5. What are the implications of this re-structuring for the MILSTAR 
program? 
B.        DISCUSSION 
The Department of Defense established the MILSTAR program in 1981 
as a joint development acquisition among the Air Force, Navy, and Army. It 
is designed to be a highly survivable satellite communications system, 
particularly resistant to electronic jamming through use of the extremely 
high frequency band. Its users include the National Command Authorities, 
chief military commanders, and strategic and tactical forces who rely on 
critical command and control communications. Its original emphasis was on 
strategic nuclear warfighting by including a low-data rate communications 
capability, primarily for sending emergency action messages to U. S. strategic 
forces during an attack. 
During the past twelve years, DOD has invested about $8 billion in the 
MILSTAR program, which has experienced several changes, delays, and cost 
increases. Each MILSTAR satellite placed in orbit will cost about $1.3 billion - 
$1 billion for the satellite and about $285 million for the Titan IV launch 
vehicle. The first satellite, which was originally scheduled for a 1987 launch, 
was launched on February 7, 1994. After this first launch, annual operating 
expenses for satellite control purposes are expected at about $110 million. 
[Endnote 2, p. 5] 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the correspondingly diminished 
Soviet threat, congressional leaders in 1990 considered MILSTAR's cost too 
high, its support to tactical forces inadequate, and its nuclear war-fighting 
capabilities unnecessary for deterrence. These concerns emerged in the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 which directed the Secretary of 
Defense to develop and carry out a plan for either a restructured MILSTAR or 
an alternative advanced communications satellite program. DOD decided to 
restructure the program. [Endnote 3, p. 5] The current debate between DOD 
and the Congress concerns this structure and how it will be implemented. 
Congress plays an important role in DOD acquisitions and the 
MILSTAR program is no exception. There are significant issues which 
congressional leaders must address, such as strategic and operational 
requirements and capabilities, system or program alternatives, funding and 
scheduling. These issues have had significant impacts on the MILSTAR 
program. Analyzing these impacts can give a better picture of how Congress 
is addressing this program given a downsizing military and a correspondingly 
shrinking defense budget. Knowing how and why Congress has exercised 
budgetary oversight over this program can help DOD plan and manage high 
profile acquisition programs. 
C        SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will examine the role that Congress has played in the 
MILSTAR acquisition cycle since its beginning in 1981. Operational and 
technical characteristics will be examined in the context of how they affect 
costs, scheduling, contractor relationships, and political interests. From this 
analysis, conclusions and implications will be derived to determine possible 
lessons learned for the MILSTAR system and other DOD acquisitions. 
The thesis uses an historical perspective of congressional resourcing 
and policy direction to give a foundation for the current status of the 
MILSTAR program. The author will review Congressional and DOD 
documents of actions on authorization and appropriation requests for fiscal 
years 1982 to 1995, House and Senate hearings and testimony regarding 
MILSTAR for the same time period, current periodicals, journals, and news 
reports to identify and describe congressional actions regarding MILSTAR 
and how these actions have impacted its acquisition process. 
D.        CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I: Introduction/Methodology/Thesis Questions - This chapter 
will define the scope and magnitude of congressional budgetary oversight of 
the MILSTAR program, identify the research questions, and describe the 
approach taken to answer them. 
Chapter II: MILSTAR Program Background - This chapter will provide 
the historical background of the MILSTAR program. 
Chapter III: Congressional Budgetary Oversight Of Military Acquisition 
Programs - This chapter will overview the congressional oversight process for 
defense programs and discuss the structure of key congressional committees 
and how they operate in the defense budget process. 
Chapter IV: Congressional Budgetary Oversight of the MILSTAR 
Program During the Cold War Years (FYs 1982-1989) - This chapter will 
examine the congressional committees and subcommittees holding budget 
oversight responsibility for the MILSTAR program and give an historical 
perspective of legislative actions taken through congressional authorizations 
and appropriations for fiscal years 1982 to 1989. 
Chapter V: Congressional Budgetary Oversight of MILSTAR -Program 
Restructuring and Revitalization (FYs 1990-1995) - This chapter will continue 
to examine the congressional committees and subcommittees holding budget 
oversight responsibility for the MILSTAR program and give an analysis of 
legislative actions taken through congressional authorizations and 
appropriations that significantly restructured and altered the mission of 
MILSTAR. 
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations - This chapter will 
summarize and discuss the MILSTAR issues addressed in previous chapters 
and give recommendations for additional research topics. 
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will identify the issues and actions that are before Congress 
and how the legislative oversight role has affected the MILSTAR satellite 
communications system program. Knowledge in this area can be beneficial to 
DOD officials by identifying and assessing congressional concerns regarding 
this program's acquisition. This enables DOD to better respond to and prepare 
for these congressional concerns and it can also help to prepare for future 
DOD acquisitions, particularly high-profile, space-related programs. 
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II. MILSTAR PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet Union began man's use of satellites with its launching of 
the Sputnik satellite in October 1957. The U. S. soon launched its own 
satellite, Explorer 1, in January of 1958, and since then man has generated a 
proliferation of satellites for uses such as weather prediction, geophysical 
studies, and navigation. The most common use though has been for global 
communications which have transmitted media such as television (video), 
telephone (voice), and teletype (digital data) to all corners of the globe. 
Satellites have made a profound impact on how man communicates and they 
continue to provide a significant vehicle for ideas to improve this capability. 
[Endnotes 1,2: pp. 13-14, p. 7] 
This communications capability through satellites has not been 
ignored by the world's military forces. The U. S. military is no exception as it 
has led in military communications worldwide as part of maintaining 
technological superiority for military readiness. The continuous debate about 
maintaining the proper and correct technological edge has increased in recent 
years among congressional leaders and Pentagon officials concerning a new 
satellite program. 
The DOD is seeking to preserve support for the MILSTAR satellite 
communications program, a system best known for its original role of 
providing strategic communications in a nuclear war. Today, with a new 
international security environment, the MILSTAR program is being 
modified to adjust to a new threat. This new threat does not include a new 
major adversary such as the former Soviet Union, but shows more potential 
for smaller adversaries and regional conflicts involving conventional forces. 
The essence of MILSTAR is that the satellite network can provide joint 
operability among the services for command and control purposes [Endnote 
6]. 
The pro-military support and patriotic fervor that swept through the 
U.S. during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 has 
subsided. Since that time, the cry from the American public has been for the 
federal government to exercise fiscal restraint and concentrate on domestic 
social programs. History is repeating itself as the American public has 
traditionally wanted to cut the military after a war or conflict and to focus on 
the country's own problems. This sentiment occurred after World Wars I & 
II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. After each conflict, there was a 
major military drawdown. 
This is the environment that the DOD is facing today as forces are being 
decreased and risky acquisition initiatives and programs face tougher battles 
for either program start or continuation. In this changed environment, the 
U. S. Congress has a more profound impact on the oversight and direction of 
the country's budgetary resources. It thus becomes the primary gateway 
through which successful military acquisition programs must pass. 
Given this situation, the DOD must reassure a critical U. S. Congress of 
MILSTAR's military necessity with its new scope and application. It must also 
do this very convincingly as even strong military supporters in Congress will 
more objectively examine the program's feasibility and practicality. 
B.        MILSTAR GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND PLAN 
The MILSTAR system has been designed to be highly survivable and 
particularly resistant to electronic jamming. Its original emphasis was on 
strategic nuclear warfighting communications for the National Command 
Authority and strategic military commanders. This emphasis has changed 
from a nuclear war scenario to one requiring improved communications 
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capabilities for not only the nation's senior leaders, but also for strategic and 
tactical military forces. [Endnote 4, p. 5] 
The original plan envisioned an eight satellite constellation. After 
DOD restructuring to reduce costs and to adapt to a new security 
environment, the constellation size was reduced to six. The MILSTAR 
program includes two types of satellite, MILSTAR I and II. The follow-on 
satellite system for MILSTAR II has recently became known as MILSTAR III. 
The original design called for a low-data rate (LDR) communications 
payload which was suitable for sending command and control information 
during a nuclear war. Satellites with this Capability are known as MILSTAR I. 
A medium-data rate (MDR) capability was developed after the program's 
restructuring to better handle the kinds of communications traffic, data rates, 
and volume that the military would expect into the next century [Endnote 6]. 
These MDR capability satellites are commonly known as MILSTAR II. 
All satellites will have LDR capability, but only satellites three through 
six will have the MDR capability. When it was decided to add MDR 
capability, satellites one and two were already far enough into production that 
it would not have been cost efficient to cancel them altogether. MDR 
capability will increase the satellite's communication capacity and improve its 
anti-jam capability. 
MILSTAR is the most advanced communications satellite ever built, 
combining new technology developments which are being used for the first 
time. These satellites will initiate use of the Extremely High Frequency (EHF) 
spectrum. This feature, along with frequency hopping techniques, will make 
enemy interception more difficult and also allow for the use of smaller and 
more mobile terminals. This ability will enable satellite networks to be 
established in minutes rather than the hours or even days previously 
required. [Endnote 6] 
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Along with the initial use of the EHF spectrum, MILSTAR has 
advanced on-board signal processing, which essentially makes the satellite 
network an automated switchboard in the sky. The system's crosslinks allow 
satellite-to-satellite communications relay, which effectively eliminates the 
need for any ground relay stations. Users talk directly to each other via the 
MILSTAR satellite. 
The first satellite of MILSTAR I was launched on February 7, 1994 and 
plans call for the second satellite to be launched in Fiscal Year (FY) 1995. 
Satellites three and four of MILSTAR II are planned for launches in the years 
1999 and 2000 respectively. Satellites five and six are planned to be launched 
in the years 2001 and 2002 [Endnote 8]. Eventually, satellites one and two will 
be deleted from the constellation and this will leave a four-satellite network 
with MDR capability. 
The follow-on to MILSTAR II is MILSTAR III which is an advanced 
satellite concept that will incorporate technologies that were not available 
when MILSTARs I and II were designed. It will use the less expensive Atlas 
medium launch vehicle rather than the expensive Titan IV launch vehicle 
which has been used for the previous MILSTARs. It is scheduled for launch 
in FY 2006. [Endnote 3, pp. 6,7] 
C        ORIGIN OF PROGRAM 
The MILSTAR concept grew out of a debate in the DOD in 1979-81 over 
the preferred satellite successor to the Air Force Satellite Communication 
System. This system had been the mainstay for the military's strategic 
communications capability, but due to system deficiencies and the need to 
replace a critical component, there evolved the idea of a follow-on system 
that had an emphasis on resistance to jamming and spacecraft survivability. 
[Endnote 5, p. 2] 
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The Air Force wanted to procure single-purpose satellites and 
designate them as the Strategic Satellite System (STRATSAT) which would 
have these satellites orbit at an altitude of 110,000 nautical miles to 
strengthen survivability. The system would use EHF frequencies, a 
previously unused portion of the radio spectrum. It would also have 
advanced electronic features to increase resistance to jamming and improve 
performance in a disturbed electromagnetic environment. [Endnote 5, p. 2] 
The Defense Science Board though, favored using a single channel 
transponder package (the transponder transmits the downlink signal by 
responding to the uplink signal) on future satellites. Proponents contended 
that an assortment of these transponders aboard several future military 
satellites would be more likely to survive a Soviet anti-satellite attack and be 
more cost effective than a system restricted to four STRATSAT satellites. 
Neither of these systems was chosen. 
The STRATSAT concept posed problems because the satellite would 
have to be extremely large with very big receivers in order to communicate 
over such a great distance [Endnote 6]. The cost effectiveness of the single 
channel transponder system was seen as modest given that it would have to 
equal STRATSAT's expected capacity, availability, and jam resistance. Instead 
of these two proposals, the DOD decided to establish a communications 
satellite architecture review that advocated a multi-mission satellite [Endnote 
5, p. 3]. 
In 1981, President Reagan announced the strategic modernization 
program which led to the formation of the MILSTAR mission and program. 
This modernization program consisted of five elements, of which 
improvements in communications and control systems were considered the 
element with the highest priority for improvement and development. In 
1983, President Reagan designated MILSTAR as a program of highest national 
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priority with Lockheed Missile and Space Company selected as the prime 
contractor. [Endnote 5, p. 3] 
D.        FORMATION OF PROGRAM 
The Air Force initiated the MILSTAR program in November 1981 and 
was designated the lead service for this joint acquisition for the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. The program is divided into three segments - the space 
segment, the mission control segment, and the terminal segment. 
The space segment originally consisted of a constellation of eight 
satellites, but this constellation has been downsized to six. These satellites 
will be cross-linked to provide worldwide communications coverage to all 
areas between 65 degrees north and 65 degrees south latitude through the use 
of electronically controlled and mechanically steered antennas. The mission 
control segment, which controls the satellites while in orbit, is directed from a 
fixed location at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado. The terminal segment 
consists of fixed and mobile ground terminals, ship and submarine terminals, 
and airborne terminals. The three services each have their own terminal 
development program offices which are directed overall by the joint terminal 
program office managed by the Navy.  [Endnote 6] 
The program's fiscal start officially began in FY 1982 with $16 million 
appropriated for the Advanced Space Communication program and $32 
million for the Air Force Satellite Communication System program. Specific 
funding for MILSTAR was first requested in the FY 1983 budget submission 
which included satellite and terminal development funds. Beginning with 
FY 1984, the terminal segment began to be funded in the Air Force Satellite 
Communications System program, and only the MILSTAR satellite and the 
mission control segment would be funded in the MILSTAR program. 
[Endnote 5, p. 4] 
14 
The program's overall headquarters is located in the Military Satellite 
Communications (MILSATCOM) Joint Program Office at Los Angeles Air 
Force Base, California. This joint program office gives general guidance for 
the MILSTAR program and is headed by an Air Force general. The MILSTAR 
Joint Terminal Program Office is located within the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command under the Navy and reports to the MILSATCOM joint 
office for direction. 
The Army's MILSTAR Project Office is located at Fort Monmouth, 
New Jersey and is the DOD executive agent for MILSTAR's ground terminal 
segment. Ground terminal users include the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, 
along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Specified Commanders-in-Chief 
(CINCs). The Air Force's Terminal Program Office is at Hanscom Air Force 
Base, Massachusetts. It oversees the development, production, and fielding of 
command post terminals for airborne and ground operations for the Air 
Force, Navy, and Army. 
E.        STATUS OF PROGRAM 
Since its beginning, the MILSTAR program has been plagued with 
schedule delays, cost increases, and program changes which have given 
MILSTAR critics substance for their attacks. This is the area where the DOD is 
having to overcome the program's negative aspects and accurately present the 
military necessity and viability of MILSTAR given the program's historical 
shortcomings and the budgetary climate of the U. S. Congress. 
Over the past twelve years, the DOD has invested about $8 billion for 
the MILSTAR program. Each satellite's average cost will be about $1.3 billion 
- $1 billion for the satellite itself and about $285 million for the Titan IV 
launch vehicle [Endnote 3, p. 5]. Congressional sources have stated that the 
program has been troubled by cost overruns averaging 35 percent per year and 
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that this could run into the billions if the program were allowed to continue 
[Endnote 7]. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
congressional leaders in 1990 deemed MILSTAR's costs as too high given that 
the system's nuclear warfighting features and capabilities seemed unnecessary 
for deterrence. MILSTAR critics have long cited these huge costs against the 
program's original and diminishing purpose in addressing its practicality. 
Also, communications support planned for tactical forces was seen as 
inadequate for such costs. [Endnote 3, p. 6] 
MILSTAR's revised mission of expanding critical communications to 
strategic and tactical forces has been the sole roadblock in preventing the 
program's termination. Critics have emphasized that its now defunct Cold 
War mission is no longer required and thus the program should be canceled. 
Pentagon officials have countered that MILSTAR offers valuable jamming- 
resistant communication channels for use by ordinary troops during 
conventional conflicts [Endnote 8]. With DOD planners considering 
MILSTAR the cornerstone of their planned satellite communications 
network for the 1990's and beyond [Endnote 10], their strategy now is to bring 
to view the military's limitations without MILSTAR and at the same time 
clearly convey MILSTAR's impacts and enhancements for future military 
roles and contingencies. 
Besides its revised mission, the program's survivability has also been 
attributed to vigorous support by defense policy heavyweights such as the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior 
congressional leaders such as the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 
Former Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in 1989 defended the 
program when the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee cut the FY 
1990  request  for  MILSTAR by  $632  million.     This  Subcommittee  also 
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recommended that the satellite network be terminated after three satellites 
were launched. In a letter to Subcommittee Chairman John P. Murtha (ID- 
Pa.), Secretary Cheney stated that any immediate savings after termination 
would be offset by funding required to maintain current systems and 
augment them with some limited EHF capability [Endnote 7]. 
Secretary Cheney also defended MILSTAR against congressional 
concerns which arose when the Reagan administration had cut MILSTAR 
research and development funding in its final defense budget request, only to 
see the Bush administration restore the program's funding. Secretary Cheney 
noted these congressional worries about the apparent lack of support for 
MILSTAR in DOD budget requests. He responded that these cuts were not 
due to a lack of support, but due to a constrained budget environment and 
that the program had unanimous support from all the Commanders-In-Chief 
(CINCs) and two recent Defense Acquisition Boards (DABs).  [Endnote 7] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee criticized DOD in its FY 1990-91 
authorization report for indicating that "funding limits" were the reason that 
the Air Force would not meet MILSTAR requirements for on-orbit satellites 
and spares. The committee reported that in DOD testimony and budget 
justifications, it was clearly shown that MILSTAR was critical to strategic and 
conventional operations. The committee therefore did not accept "funding 
limits" as a rationale for not adhering to acknowledged requirements. 
[Endnote 7] 
These and other congressional concerns about MILSTAR prompted its 
leaders to include directives in the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 
1991 for the Secretary of Defense to terminate MILSTAR or develop a strategy 
to either restructure it or produce an alternative advanced satellite 
communications program. DOD chose to restructure the program to reflect 
changing military requirements and reduced defense budgets. [Endnote 9, p. 
122] 
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The restructuring took out the nuclear war-fighting capabilities and 
expanded the communications role to conventional forces of the Army and 
Navy. The constellation size was reduced from eight to six satellites and the 
life-cycle costs were reduced by 25 percent. Secretary Cheney cut costs further 
by reducing the constellation size from six to four satellites [Endnote 9, p. 122], 
given that an eventual four MDR satellite network would meet mission 
requirements. With the restructuring which brought in the MDR capability, 
the Defense Acquisition Board approved the start of the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase for this new communications payload in 
October 1992. 
President Clinton's election in 1992 brought in the new Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin who took on the MILSTAR program by first examining it 
through his Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) of the Defense Department. The BUR 
looked at the program by addressing the following issues: whether MILSTAR 
was affordable; whether an advanced satellite concept could be developed in 
time to eliminate the requirement for all or some of the planned MILSTAR 
satellites; and whether DOD could do without MILSTAR's capabilities until 
the advanced system could be fielded [Endnote 9, p. 122]. 
The BUR report concluded that technologies were not mature enough 
to accelerate an advanced satellite to replace all or part of MILSTAR and that 
DOD tactical forces could not wait another ten years for jam-resistant satellite 
communications. The BUR also concluded that the advanced satellite 
concept should be pursued to eventually replace MILSTAR after its useful life 
cycle by the middle of the next decade. The BUR felt that this manner of 
initiating MILSTAR and then launching the advanced satellite system would 
achieve additional cost savings so that MILSTAR would now cost less than 
half of its projected costs as of FY 1991. [Endnote 9, p. 123] 
The Army and Navy have become staunch MILSTAR supporters due 
to the satellite's expanded scope and applications.  These two services operate 
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in close proximity to the enemy where protected communications are vital. 
The Air Force, in contrast, faces only a minor jamming threat to its rear base 
communications. With the revised mission, the Air Force sought to 
terminate the program because it was paying for most of the development 
costs and the satellite's restructuring left little additional capability for its 
deployed tactical air wings. Secretary Aspin overruled the Air Force though 
and kept the program going [Endnote 11]. This Air Force termination request 
raised the issue of the service that should lead the MILSTAR program; this 
issue is currently under DOD review. 
In 1994, two General Accounting Office (GAO) reports both asserted 
that the DOD could save over $2 billion if the new advanced satellite concept, 
or MILSTAR III, was inserted after satellite four and that satellites five and six 
should be deleted. DOD is concerned with this proposal in that canceling the 
last two satellites will leave a two-year gap in attaining a four-satellite 
constellation with MDR capabilities [Endnote 6]. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee recently directed the Secretary of Defense to assess the GAO 
findings and report back to the congressional defense committees no later 
than December 1994 [Endnote 9, p. 123]. 
A recent Critical Design Review (CDR) of MILSTAR conducted with 
the prime contractor, Lockheed Missile and Space Company, showed great 
promise for the program's successful continuation. A six-satellite 
constellation with MILSTARs I & II appears to be a reality and fabrication of 
satellites three through six will occur concurrently.  [Endnote 12] 
This concurrent production for the remaining satellites, say 
congressional proponents, will result in a more efficient way of doing 
business. Cancellation efforts will become harder if the satellites are already 
built because any savings leverage that could be gained is actually lost after 
fabrication. This approach should get the program "over the hump" for its 
survival and progression. [Endnote 12] 
19 
Some MILSTAR congressional opponents still argue that the satellite is 
a Cold War relic. But Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator 
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) recently defended MILSTAR when he stated that 
opponents attack MILSTAR as it was two and three years ago and not now. 
Senator Nunn also stated that the Pentagon completely eliminated those 
features of the satellite which would keep it working during an all-out 
nuclear war [Endnote 11]. The system's revised mission has helped the 
program's continuity in this aspect as MILSTAR survived recent 
congressional budget actions for the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act 
in both congressional houses. 
This thesis will address congressional oversight for the MILSTAR 
program since its fiscal beginning in 1982 through its latest program status in 
FY 95. Research will particularly focus on congressional oversight from 1990 
when significant congressional interest brought about a major change in the 
program's mission and structure. The following chapter will give the reader 
a foundation for understanding congressional oversight of DOD acquisition 
programs through the defense budget process. 
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III. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
A.       OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, gives Congress authority to 
review government operations and administration. The more common 
name for this congressional action is "oversight." It is based on the inherent 
power to appropriate money and see to its proper spending. 
Congressional oversight of military affairs was first recorded in 1792 
when Congress investigated the poor quality of powder and uniforms which 
was blamed for General St. Clair's defeat by the Indians in the West. 
Oversight did not significantly appear again until the 1860's when there was 
established the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the Civil War. After this 
episode, congressional oversight was again relegated to a minor role until the 
New Deal (1930s) and World War II, when suddenly there was much activity 
for the Congress to oversee. [Endnote 1, p. 97] 
Congress exercises DOD oversight primarily through the Defense 
budget process. Over the past twenty years or more, the scope and level of 
detail of congressional defense budget oversight have increased significantly 
with many measures of activity doubling and even trebling in short periods 
[Endnote 2, p. 1]. The Watergate incident in the early 1970's was a primary 
impetus in the growth of congressional oversight. It generated new 
skepticism and further increased the mistrust between Congress and the 
Executive Branch. This result trickled down to DOD as the number of 
hearings, testimonies, briefings, and congressional directions to DOD since 
then have risen sharply. Other factors which have contributed to this 
oversight growth include the large portion of discretionary spending in the 
federal budget represented by defense; the desire of members of Congress to 
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serve constituent interests; and the gradual integration of more liberal 
congressional members into the defense authorization and appropriation 
committees who have challenged the status quo. These elements put 
together over the years have minimized the "coziness" which once existed 
between DOD and Congress and created an adversarial relationship. 
[Endnotes 1, 2: p. 20, p. 1] 
This adversarial relationship intensified in the 1980's due to the fraud, 
waste, and abuse that was evident in DOD as stories of hammers and toilet 
seats costing in the hundreds of dollars painted the nation's newspaper 
headlines. This brought in even more congressional oversight and increased 
Congress' skepticism of DOD's ability to manage its business and acquisition 
activities. Outside agencies such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
were brought in and authorized by Congress to assist in military acquisition 
program evaluation and assessment. 
The impact of this oversight has been that DOD has argued for 
Congress to concentrate on broad objectives and just give DOD the money to 
do the job. Congress has responded that it would if DOD would manage itself 
better, produce weapons that function correctly, and stay out of the 
newspapers with acquisition mismanagement stories. In short, Congress has 
become unwilling to grant carte blanche to DOD without having significant 
oversight in how business is conducted, especially with acquisition programs. 
[Endnote 1, p. 98] 
In this climate, the Secretary of Defense in 1990 wrote a White Paper on 
the relationship between DOD and the Congress. In its recommendations, re- 
establishing trust was a first requirement for DOD and Congress to work better 
together. It stated that the many budget details, which are frequently natural 
points of antagonism, have had a substantial negative effect on the 
promotion of productive DOD-congressional relationships. Other 
recommendations of the White Paper focus on the process and structure for 
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Congress' budgetary oversight and how it might be improved [Endnote 2, p. 
31]. Congressional oversight is a fact for the DOD and using such 
recommendations as provided by the Secretary of Defense's White Paper may 
foster a more trusting and productive relationship between the two mutually 
dependent organizations. In the meantime, military acquisition officials 
must appreciate congressional viewpoints and make every effort to 
accommodate and promote good working relationships with Congress. These 
professional efforts will help DOD to work with Congress in balancing micro- 
management against reasonable direction.  [Endnote 1, p. 99] 
The MILSTAR program is a prime example of a program that has 
experienced keen congressional oversight in its acquisition cycle. It also 
shows how Congress in its oversight role is able to not only significantly 
impact a program's very existence, but it also has a great influence on a 
program's structure and mission. 
The following sections of this chapter discuss the structure of the key 
congressional committees that are involved in the DOD budget process and 
how the budget process itself operates for the oversight of military acquisition 
programs. 
B.        CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STRUCTURE FOR DOD BUDGET 
OVERSIGHT 
Before discussing the main Congressional committees which are 
involved in the DOD budget oversight process, it is important for the reader 
to understand first the committees that dominate oversight for defense 
programs. 
Two committees each in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate have direct oversight of defense and the DOD budget. They are known 
as the "Defense Committees."   Some 23 standing congressional committees 
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and subcommittees in both houses have at varying times interest in and 
some jurisdiction over DOD matters, but it is these four Defense Committees 
that play the major role and have the greatest impact on the DOD budget 
process and particularly on DOD acquisition programs. [Endnote 1, p. 21] 
1. House Committees 
The two important committees in the House of Representatives 
regarding the defense budget process are the National Security Committee 
(formerly the House Armed Services Committee), which oversees 
authorizations, and the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) which 
oversees appropriations. 
The National Security Committee is the re-structured House Armed 
Services Committee which changed with the new 104th Congress. Its six 
subcommittees have been reduced to five, of which the Military Procurement 
Subcommittee and the Military Research and Development (R&D) 
Subcommittee are of particular interest to DOD acquisition officials. These 
two subcommittees have direct oversight for authorizations to DOD 
procurement and R&D programs. 
The House Appropriations Committee has 13 subcommittees, of which 
the National Security Subcommittee (formerly Defense Subcommittee), has 
direct oversight for appropriations to DOD acquisition programs. The work of 
the National Security Subcommittee is usually accepted by the full 
Appropriations Committee. 
2. Senate Committees 
The two important committees in the Senate regarding the defense 
budget process are the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) which 
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oversees authorizations and the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) 
which oversees appropriations. 
The Senate Armed Services Committee has six subcommittees, of 
which the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee directly oversees 
defense acquisition programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee, like its 
counterpart in the House of Representatives, also has 13 subcommittees of 
which the Defense Subcommittee has direct oversight for defense 
appropriations for procurement and R&D programs. And again, as in the 
House, the work of the Defense Subcommittee is usually accepted by the full 
Appropriations Committee. 
DOD acquisition officials are naturally most concerned with these four 
Defense Committees. Depending on the nature of the four chairmen, these 
four committees have shown tendencies of independence within Congress. 
Their members wield substantial influence concerning formulation of 
defense policy, programs, weapons and their management and execution. 
Their staffs are generally regarded as experienced, capable, and realistic. 
[Endnote 1, p. 27] 
The Defense Committees have tended to attract Members interested in 
defense policy and benefits derived from the defense budget. The military has 
a natural support base among these Members since most represent military 
bases or defense industries. Although Members of these four Defense 
Committees could be labeled as "pro-defense," with DOD mismanagement 
and the introduction of differing viewpoints, these Members are more 
objective and thus are not necessarily "pro-DOD." In particular, the National 
Security Committee of the House has in recent years attracted Members who 
wish to change the course of defense policy or activities. This has resulted in 
diverse views on defense policy and programs and has contributed to the 
more watchful eye of Congress. [Endnote 1, p. 20] 
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This is the operational environment that DOD acquisition programs 
such as MILSTAR confront. DOD officials must realize the scrutiny and level 
of detail that they are expected to know and present to Congress to satisfy 
congressional concerns. An acquisition program's three critical factors of cost, 
schedule, and performance have far-reaching impacts as Congress uses these 
factors through the defense budget process in exercising its acquisition 
oversight responsibility. 
The following section will discuss in more detail how the defense 
budget process works and how the four Defense Committees interact with it 
to oversee defense acquisition programs. 
C.        THE    CONGRESSIONAL    BUDGET    PROCESS    AND    DOD 
ACQUISITION   OVERSIGHT 
The process through which the President's budget is acted upon, with 
its authorization and appropriation bills, preceded by a concurrent budget 
resolution in both congressional Houses which sets budget limits, is called the 
congressional budget process. The process begins when the President submits 
his annual budget to Congress in January-February outlining his 
requirements for funding the Executive Branch for the next fiscal year which 
begins in October. [Endnote 1, p. 55] 
The process occurs as outlined by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
(P. L. 94-344) and as amended by three later laws: the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Reduction Act of 1985, known as Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings (GRH); the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (GRH-2); and the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 
1990. [Endnote 3, p. 30] 
It is important to note that the BEA divides federal spending into two 
areas: direct spending, or entitlement programs such as Social Security, and 
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discretionary spending, of which DOD is the major component. Considerable 
attention is given to defense activities when Members are looking for ways to 
reduce the Federal deficit and curtail government spending.  [Endnote 1, p. 58] 
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 act, along with its amendments, 
brought in the "extra" step to the more commonly known "two-step" budget 
process. The first step to occur is the passage of the Concurrent Budget 
Resolution (CBR). The CBR operates as an annual concurrent resolution on 
the budget. Its main purpose is to provide an overview of the entire Federal 
budget, creating a framework for consideration of subsequent revenue, 
spending, and other budget-related legislation. The resulting CBR sets 
aggregate budget and functional policies. Moreover, because a concurrent 
resolution is not a law, the CBR does not have any statutory effect. Thus, no 
money can be raised or spent pursuant to it. [Endnote 4, p. 51] 
The second step is the authorization process. It results in an 
authorizations act which is a law passed by Congress that formally establishes 
the statutory authority for Federal government agencies and programs, 
including DOD. The act though, does not permit any money to be spent 
(budget authority). Authorization is a prerequisite step before Congress can 
appropriate budget authority to agencies such as DOD. [Endnote 5, p. 11] 
The third step is the appropriations process which creates the budget 
authority to fund Federal government agencies and programs. It results in an 
appropriations act which is a law passed by Congress that provides Federal 
agencies the legal authority to incur obligations. It also gives the Treasury 
Department authority to make payments for these Federal agencies in their 
designated purposes. [Endnotes 3,4: p. 28, p. 125] 
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1.  Concurrent Budget Resolution 
The first legislative action that Congress takes on the defense budget is 
to establish a ceiling on funding for national defense programs in the annual 
Concurrent Budget Resolution. The budget resolution provides a means for 
Congress to review overall national budget priorities and to consider program 
funding in the context of the entire Federal budget, instead of dealing with 
each budget function in isolation. The House and Senate Budget 
Committees, created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, make aggregate, 
and not line item (individual) decisions on ceiling caps for budget authority 
and outlays for the national defense budget function.  [Endnote 3, p. 30] 
The CBR establishes overall targets for national defense, but it does not 
say how these funds should be allocated to specific defense programs. Since 
defense is a major component of discretionary spending, major defense 
program issues underlying the funding amounts are often discussed in the 
reports accompanying each budget resolution. Recommendations on 
priorities within the defense budget are also often discussed in Budget 
Committee hearings. These recommendations are occasionally mentioned in 
floor debate on the resolution as some Budget Committee Members take the 
opportunity to voice their views on how to achieve defense funding targets. 
Although these views on major defense programs and issues are not binding 
on any of the Defense Committees, they often influence the final outcome. 
Actual decisions on defense funding priorities though, are made only in the 
defense authorization and appropriation acts.  [Endnotes 3, 4 : p. 31, p. 53] 
Within the law, no authorizations or appropriations can be considered 
until the budget resolution is passed. In reality, they are, because of the usual 
delays in passing the resolution, which cause severe time constraints. The 
practice has been for the authorizing and appropriating committees to begin 
their work without the budget resolution if necessary.    The final budget 
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resolution is supposed to be passed by April 15. Although the House and 
Senate often pass the budget resolution separately by April 15, they often do 
not reach final agreement on it until after the deadline, sometimes months 
later. [Endnotes 1,4: pp. 62-63, p. 51] 
2. Authorization Process 
Authorization legislation has a dual purpose: (1) it is the means by 
which Congress establishes policy and exercises control of Federal agencies, 
and (2) it provides the authority under House and Senate rules for Congress 
to appropriate funds. With this, an authorization act is legislation that both 
establishes, continues, or modifies an agency or program, and authorizes the 
enactment of appropriations for that agency or program [Endnote 4, p. 113]. 
Authorization looks at line items and appropriations account totals, but it 
does not convey obligational authority to actually spend (outlay) funds 
[Endnote 1, p. 79]. Out of the authorization process evolves the National 
Defense Authorization Act of which the Research, Development, Testing, 
and Evaluation (RDT&E) account and the Procurement account are of most 
importance to DOD acquisition officials. 
Up until 1959, most authorizations were permanent (with no time 
limit). The only programs authorized annually were manpower end- 
strengths, military construction, and family housing programs. Since then, 
more and more defense programs have been subject to annual 
authorizations, beginning with procurement programs such as for aircraft 
and missiles and continuing working-capital funds. Today, only military 
personnel programs are not specifically authorized in the Defense 
Authorization Act, but personnel issues such as pay raises and end-strengths 
are authorized in this act. [Endnote 3, p. 32] 
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There are two main reasons for this trend to annual authorizations. 
First, an annual authorization act gives Congress frequent opportunities to 
review an agency's activities and to make changes through law as it deems 
appropriate. Congress is likely to seek additional control when it lacks 
confidence in an agency. Second, annual authorizations enhance the 
influence of authorizing committees in Congress, especially with respect to 
the amounts subsequently appropriated to affected agencies such as DOD. 
[Endnote 4, p. 114] 
Authorizations represent the exercise by Congress of its legislative 
power. In the exercise of this legislative power, Congress can place just about 
any type of provision (other than appropriations or revenue provisions) in 
authorizing legislation. It can direct what an agency must do or may not do 
in the performance of its assigned responsibilities. It can give the agency a 
broad grant of authority or legislate in great detail. There is no uniform 
structure or format for authorizing legislation. In practice though, virtually 
all contemporary authorization measures contain one or more provisions 
authorizing funds to be appropriated for designated purposes. [Endnote 4, p. 
113] 
This annual authorization process gives the House and Senate, and 
their legislative committees, regular opportunities to review the programs 
and performance of Federal agencies such as DOD. The process thus 
encourages and improves congressional oversight for Congress as 
instructions in authorization acts can make changes in agency functions and 
re-direct program policy. Also, the defense authorizing committees now 
authorize funding at the same line-item level as the defense appropriations 
committees, thus giving them another "looking glass" in conducting DOD 
oversight. [Endnote 5, p. 13] 
The authorization work for DOD is conducted by the National Security 
Committee of the House and the Senate Armed Services Committee.   They 
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both hold extensive hearings, but customarily the National Security 
Committee spends more time on the details. The defense budget areas are 
dispersed among the subcommittees of each full defense authorizing 
committee where the defense request (bill) is reviewed from the aggregate to 
the minutiae. These actions not only involve hearings, but also briefings and 
testimony from various DOD officials who are directly or indirectly connected 
to a military acquisition program. 
The subcommittees "mark-up" or review the bill line-by-line agreeing, 
deleting, or making changes and then the same is done by the full committees 
[Endnote 1, p. 75]. Following mark-up, each House begins floor action on its 
respective bill, with amendments offered and voted on followed by floor 
votes on approving the amended bill. Differences between the House and 
Senate versions of the bill are resolved in Conference Committee. The 
revised version produced by this committee is returned to each House floor 
for final votes. When the final version is signed by the President, DOD has its 
annual authorization.  [Endnotes 3,1: p. 33, p. 83] 
3. Appropriations Process 
The third major step in the defense budget process is the 
appropriations process. Appropriations provide budget authority which 
authorizes Federal agencies to obligate funds. 
The power of appropriation derives from the Constitution which 
provides that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in 
consequence of appropriations made by law." The power to appropriate is 
strictly a legislative power; it functions as a limitation on the executive 
branch. An agency may not spend more than the amount appropriated to it, 
and it may use available funds only for the purposes and according to the 
conditions provided by Congress.   In recent times, appropriations also have 
33 
been viewed as mandates that the funds be used to carry out the activities 
intended by Congress. [Endnote 4, p. 125] 
The Constitution does not require annual appropriations, but since the 
First Congress the practice has been to make appropriations for a single fiscal 
year. Appropriations must be used (obligated) in the fiscal year for which they 
were provided, unless the law provides that they shall be available for a 
longer period of time. All provisions in an appropriations act, such as 
limitations in the use of funds, expire at the end of the fiscal year, unless the 
language of the act extends their period of effectiveness.  [Endnote 4, p. 125] 
Once legislative authority has been established for defense programs, 
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees review defense and other 
programs. Traditionally, the HAC plays an almost adversarial role within the 
Congress, seeing the authorizing committees (such as defense) primarily as 
advocates for their respective agency funding requests. The HAC is the 
"guardian of the purse" and pays close attention to details, new programs, and 
program increases. The SAC looks at the process as one of ensuring that the 
"lower house" does not "give away the store."  [Endnote 1, p. 86] 
The National Security Subcommittee of the HAC and the Defense 
Subcommittee of the SAC both hold hearings and listen to statements from 
key DOD officials such as the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. These subcommittees review the President's defense 
budget request and then mark-up defense appropriations legislation before 
full committee mark-up. Floor action and conference committees then 
proceed in the same manner as with the authorization acts. These actions 
result in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act where funds 
appropriated for DOD programs and any limitations or special requirements 
for fund use are spelled out.  [Endnote 3, p. 34] 
Congress does not formally specify in the language of the appropriation 
act itself the levels of funding for every single item in the defense budget. 
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Most appropriations are for lump sums such as for aircraft procurement; the 
specific item such as an F-18 aircraft is not individually listed. Funding for 
specific line items can be found in committee reports on the defense 
appropriations acts. [Endnote 3, pp. 35-36] 
As for all other Federal agencies, the DOD Appropriations Act also 
legislates annual appropriations for virtually all defense activities and 
programs. The budget justification process for acquisition programs thus 
becomes a continuous and arduous task. DOD acquisition officials are 
challenged to know their particular programs to an excruciating level of 
detail. These officials know that Congress has several means of oversight 
through the authorizations and appropriations process to probe and 
investigate any hint of cost, schedule, and performance problems. Again, 
DOD must work with the Defense Committees in this balancing of micro- 
management versus reasonable direction from Congress. 
This chapter has given an overview of congressional defense oversight 
and discussed the four main congressional committees which have direct 
oversight responsibility for defense and how the defense budget process 
operates. DOD acquisition programs such as MILSTAR must pass through 
this main gateway annually in order to progress through the five military 
acquisition phases. Successfully completing these phases culminates in the 
production, deployment, and operation of a DOD major acquisition item. 
The following chapters will particularly discuss the congressional budget 
oversight that has occurred in the MILSTAR program since its fiscal 
beginning in 1982 to its current budgetary status in FY 95. 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT OF THE MILSTAR 
PROGRAM DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS ( FYs 1982-1989) 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 brought in a new 
administration with a distinctly different view on how to manage and 
operate the Department of Defense. The framework for this new thinking for 
our military forces was that the Cold War with the Soviet Union was still at 
its zenith. President Reagan had labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire," 
and thus began the largest peacetime military build-up in our nation's 
history. [Endnote 1, p. 140 ] 
Out of this build-up evolved the Strategic Modernization Program in 
the fall of 1981. This modernization program was composed of five elements, 
of which improvements in communications and control systems were 
considered the element with the highest national priority. With the ever- 
present threat of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the emphasis on 
communications led to the development of the MILSTAR mission and 
program. [Endnote 2, p. 3] 
MILSTAR was designed to provide LDR communications for strategic 
and tactical military forces, primarily during a nuclear conflict. The highest 
priority users were expected to be strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces, 
with tactical ground, naval, and air forces having a lower priority. Its original 
design included many features intended to allow the system to survive and 
operate in a nuclear war.  [Endnote 3, Section V] 
The U. S. Air Force was designated the lead service for this joint 
acquisition program among the Army, Navy, and Air Force and officially 
initiated the program in November, 1981. Specific funding for MILSTAR 
would be provided through the Air Force's RDT&E budget line in the DOD 
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budget. As stated previously in this thesis, resources for MILSTAR's three 
segments would be divided by funding the terminal segment under the Air 
Force Satellite Communications System program, while the mission control 
and space (MILSTAR satellite) segments would be funded in the MILSTAR 
program budget line (Program Element #33603F) [Endnote 2, p. 4]. This and 
the following chapter will address congressional budgetary oversight of 
MILSTAR by focusing on this main MILSTAR program budget line. 
Due to the program's initial security classification and subsequent 
protection of certain funding information , the author will focus the research 
of the MILSTAR program through examination of congressional language 
and budgetary funding amounts that are available from authorization and 
appropriation acts and from DOD Comptroller cost data. The author will 
glean the congressional attitude toward this high-risk military acquisition 
program through this budgetary oversight. 
This focus will examine the program's fiscal life through the DOD 
authorization and appropriation process for budget actions taken by the four 
Defense Committees. This will provide insight into how and why Congress, 
through oversight of the defense budget process, impacted and significantly 
altered the MILSTAR program. 
B.        MILSTAR PROGRAM FUNDING, FISCAL YEARS 1982 -1989 
The MILSTAR program had its official fiscal start in FY 1982, with $16 
million immersed in the Air Force's RDT&E budget through the Advanced 
Communication System program and $32 million with the Air Force Satellite 
Communications System program [Endnote 2, p. 4]. Language in the Senate's 
version of the FY 1982 Defense Authorization Act and in conference with the 
House supported the development of a new architecture, multi-mission 
satellite intended to augment and/or replace key communications functions 
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in the later part of the 1980's. This new satellite's funding would be part of 
the President's objectives for improving the strategic command, control, and 
communications program of the defense modernization program. The 
MILSTAR program was not specifically listed in the DOD budget until FY 
1983. [Endnotes 4, 5: p. 107, p. 83] 
1. A Fast Start, FY 1983 Funding 
In this the first full year of the MILSTAR program, it was advertised by 
DOD and understood by Congress as a satellite communications system that 
was survivable in a nuclear environment and having jam-resistant 
communications using the EHF frequency spectrum. These capabilities, along 
with MILSTAR's proposed role of providing critical strategic 
communications, gave sufficient justification for Congress to add more funds 
to this program from the original DOD request.  [Endnote 6, p. 98] 
The FY 1983 DOD request for MILSTAR, through the RDT&E budget of 
the Air Force, was for $79.784 million. The House Armed Services 
Committee did not make any changes to the DOD request in its mark-up of 
the authorization bill. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
though, recommended the addition of $50 million due to the DOD 
accelerating the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the MILSTAR system 
to 1987. Congressional testimony had indicated that, in the final budget 
process, the full amount of funding needed in FY 1983 to permit attainment 
of the earlier IOC was inadvertently not provided. The funding shortfall 
amounted to $50 million and the SASC added the full shortfall amount to 
eliminate it and to also help the program meet the earlier IOC date. The 
importance of the program was made clear as a request that MILSTAR be 
afforded a Presidentially-conferred procurement priority was granted by 
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President Reagan in 1983 as he designated MILSTAR a program of highest 
national priority.  [Endnotes 6, 7: p. 98, p. 5] 
In Conference deliberations between the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees, $38 million was agreed upon to add to the original DOD 
request. Therefore, a total of $117.784 million was authorized for research and 
development of the MILSTAR program. Moreover, the Conference 
Committee emphasized the importance of MILSTAR meeting its planned 
IOC date and the conferees expected that DOD would take appropriate steps in 
future fiscal years to ensure that this high priority program would be 
sufficiently funded to meet the planned IOC date.  [Endnote 8, p. 129] 
The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) concurred with the 
MILSTAR funding amount as was written in the authorizing legislation. 
This committee also expressed the same sentiments as the authorizing 
committees that DOD would ensure proper funding in order for MILSTAR to 
meet the earlier IOC date. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) 
recommended an addition of only $10 million [Endnote 10], as language in its 
defense appropriations bill stated that the committee was not inclined to 
recommend any additional funding without a budget amendment, but would 
consider a reprogramming or supplemental budget request accompanied with 
adequate justification [Endnote 11, p. 143]. In conference, the appropriations 
committees agreed on the additional $38 million as authorized in conference 
and as supported by the HAC. MILSTAR thus officially began its research and 
development with $117.784 million and on strong footing for continued 
congressional funding support for future fiscal years [Endnote 12, p. 157]. 
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Table 1 
FY 1983 MILSTAR Funding 



















79,784 0 +50,000 +38,000 117,784 +38,000 +10,000 +38,000 117,784 
(Endnotes 8,9,10,11,12) 
2. FYs 1984-1989 Funding 
a. A Period of Growth, FYs 1984-1986 Funding 
For Fiscal Year 1984, only two of the DOD authorization and 
appropriation bills produced by the four Defense Committees address the 
MILSTAR program specifically. The Omnibus Defense Act for 1984, written 
by the SASC, does not list MILSTAR individually in its Program Element list 
for Air Force RDT&E programs, but it does discuss MILSTAR funding. 
The Reagan administration requested $149.9 million for research 
and development for MILSTAR. The SASC indicated that it continued to 
strongly support the MILSTAR program and it applauded the DOD for 
slowing the development pace so as to minimize the risk and reduce the 
concurrency involved in the previous MILSTAR development plan. The 
SASC though, did warn DOD to resist the temptation to make additional slips 
in the IOC date other than for sound program management. The Committee 
recommended authorization of the full $149.9 million request for MILSTAR 
research and development for FY 1984.  [Endnote 13, pp. 164-165] 
The only committee in the House to address MILSTAR 
specifically through DOD bills was the HAC.  Although it did not specifically 
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list MILSTAR funding in its appropriations for Air Force RDT&E programs, 
this committee did express concerns that the services were developing their 
own MILSTAR communication terminals and that interoperability would 
not be achieved as needed. The HAC directed the Secretary of Defense and 
each of the Service Secretaries to carefully monitor the separate development 
efforts and take whatever steps necessary to ensure that the MILSTAR system 
was interoperable "end-to-end."  [Endnote 14, p. 241] 
Although the exact amount authorized and appropriated to 
MILSTAR for FY 1984 cannot be determined through stated DOD bills, 
MILSTAR system costs are listed as $149.908 million for FY 1984 in the U. S. 
Weapon Systems Costs, 1983 manual [Endnote 15, p. A-10]. This amount 
corresponds to the authorized amount from the SASC. 
Congress exercised its oversight authority in 1984, as the SASC 
noted that there had been a program schedule slippage and the HAC 
addressed the potential of service communication interoperability problems. 
Congress showed itself to be "focusing" its congressional oversight 
microscope more as typical military acquisition program problems appeared 
in MILSTAR. Even with these concerns, the MILSTAR program in this year 
had strong congressional funding support. 
That support continued in FY 1985. The Administration 
requested an overall total of $466 million for MILSTAR, of which $325 
million was specified for the satellite and mission control segments. Only 
the SASC addressed MILSTAR authorizations and its defense authorization 
bill strongly endorsed MILSTAR and recommended the full requested 
amount. The program is not addressed specifically by the HASC or in 
Conference Committee with the Senate.   [Endnote 16, pp. 166-167] 
MILSTAR support is again strongly shown in appropriation bills 
as the House, Senate, and in Conference Committee all appropriated the 
requested $325 million.   In this year though, the first congressional concerns 
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regarding MILSTAR's costs are revealed. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee addressed its concerns, along with the GAO, that the total cost of 
MILSTAR had not been reported to Congress. Moreover, directives were 
given for DOD to deliver the results to the committee of an independent cost 
analysis of the satellite and mission control segment, and DOD's budget plans 
for the total program. The appropriation committees increased their 
oversight as MILSTAR's non-disclosure of total costs encouraged further 
investigation of the MILSTAR program.   [Endnotes 17, 18, 19: p. 243, p. 193, 
196, p. 373] 
Strong congressional support continued into FY 1986 as the 
Administration requested $346 million for MILSTAR R&D, along with $132 
million for R&D of MILSTAR terminals. The authorizing committees only 
specifically listed MILSTAR terminals and did not list the satellite and 
mission control segment in its RDT&E authorizations. The SASC continued 
its support as it recommended the full funding for MILSTAR.   [Endnote 20, 
pp. 159-160] 
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees separately 
and in conference appropriated the full requested amount of $345.946 million 
for MILSTAR. These appropriation bills did not discuss MILSTAR's main 
budget category and thus did not give a complete indication of the level of 
congressional oversight for FY 1986. MILSTAR was viewed as a program that 
had strong congressional support, given that the military threat of the Soviet 
Union was still very evident. [Endnotes 21, 22, 23: p. 340, p. 322, p. 254] 
These three fiscal years marked a time of growth and strong 
congressional support for MILSTAR, as appropriation amounts gradually 
increased during this time. Despite these positive indicators, the four Defense 
Committees at varying times exercised their oversight responsibilities by 
expressing their concerns over possible problems in interoperability among 
the services and especially concerns about not having full disclosure of total 
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MILSTAR costs. This cost concern was amplified in subsequent fiscal years as 
cost, schedule, and performance problems appeared and consequently 
induced Congress and the Defense Committees to significantly elevate their 
oversight of the MILSTAR program. 
The following table shows costs for  1984 and appropriated 
funding for FYs 1985 and 1986 for the main MILSTAR budget category. 
Table 2 
1984 1985 1986 
$149.9 M $325,042 M $345,946 M 
(Endnotes 15,19, 23) 
b. Peak and Decline, FYs 1987-1989 Funding 
Fiscal Year 1987 marked the first year where the full DOD 
requested amount for MILSTAR was reduced. The Administration requested 
$493.357 million for the main MILSTAR budget category. The House Armed 
Services Committee was the first to make a cut as it decreased the requested 
amount by $16.1 million to $477.257 million. The House authorization bill 
did not discuss its rationale for this reduction.  [Endnote 24, p. 127] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee addressed MILSTAR in 
its authorization bill, as budgetary considerations were the reason given for a 
$25 million reduction in DOD's request. It also stated in the SASC's bill that 
these adjustments to MILSTAR due to the funding cut should not affect the 
scheduled launch date for the first satellite. Congress was thus "tightening 
the noose" on DOD to keep its schedule on track despite funding cuts. 
[Endnote 25, p. 159,172] 
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In conference, the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees agreed on a $25 million reduction, authorizing $468,357 million 
for MILSTAR. Strong congressional support was still evident, but 
MILSTAR's increasing budget showed its strain on the DOD budget. Despite 
the program's "heroic" entrance, funding request levels were reduced. 
[Endnote 26, p. 428] 
When the DOD MILSTAR request went to the Defense 
Subcommittee of the HAC, this subcommittee recommended the full 
requested amount for MILSTAR's main budget. The Defense Subcommittee 
of the SAC though, agreed with the SASC authorization and appropriated 
$468.357 million for MILSTAR. The Appropriations Conference Committee 
adopted the Senate's version and appropriated the same amount. None of 
the appropriation bills discussed a rationale for MILSTAR funding cuts. This 
fiscal year marked the funding highlight for the MILSTAR program during 
the Cold War years; with the Soviet Union gradually deteriorating, this 
would later have corresponding effects on the MILSTAR program.   [Endnotes 
27, 28: p. 326, p. 571] 
In Fiscal Year 1988, none of the authorization or appropriation 
bills discussed the MILSTAR main budget category, nor do they list any 
funding amounts. However, during this time, world events were changing 
and the Cold War with the Soviet Union was gradually "thawing." 
Congressional leaders, who wanted to divert defense funds to domestic 
categories, saw the national security changes as an opportunity to "raid" 
questionable military programs whose Cold War purpose was eroding. 
The U. S. Weapons Systems Costs Manual of 1988 lists 
MILSTAR's main budget category as costing $384.779 million for FY 1988. 
This reduced amount from FY 1987 (17-18%), showed that congressional 
concerns may have been more apparent as cost overruns and schedule 
slippages may have diminished congressional support.   The planned launch 
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date for the first satellite was for 1987 and this did not occur. This unmet goal 
more than likely significantly increased congressional oversight for 
MILSTAR even as domestic concerns were taking on more prominence in 
the congressional agenda.  [Endnote 29, p. A-8] 
Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney may have best 
ascertained MILSTAR's status during the late 1980's when he stated in 1989 
that past funding cuts by the DOD for MILSTAR were the result of a 
constrained budget environment, and not a lack of support from DOD 
[Endnote 30]. By DOD cutting into the MILSTAR program budget and also 
continually emphasizing its military need, conflicting signals were sent to 
Congress as more "dovish" congressional Members saw DOD's position as a 
cause to scrutinize MILSTAR even more. 
The authorization and appropriation bills for FY 1989 are also 
silent as in FY 1988. None of these bills discussed the MILSTAR program 
specifically. The House Armed Services Committees did list the main 
funding category for MILSTAR, but it did not indicate any funding amounts. 
This is also the case for the Conference Committee for the House and Senate 
as MILSTAR showed no funding authorized.  [Endnotes 31, 32: p. 152, p. 329] 
The Appropriations Bills for FY 1989 also did not discuss 
MILSTAR or list the main budget category. However, the U. S. Weapons 
Systems Costs Manual for 1990 did list the main MILSTAR budget category as 
costing $272.778 million for FY 1989 [Endnote 33, p. B-16]. This is a significant 
drop from the previous fiscal year. 
In 1989, Glasnost and Perestroika reforms were making sweeping 
changes throughout Europe, as former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev 
was credited for ending the Cold War in 1989. The Berlin Wall was leveled 
and the national security of the U. S. was going through a major re-defining. 
More and more the stated purpose of MILSTAR to sustain communications 
during a nuclear war with the Soviets was seen as unnecessary, and with its 
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high costs and schedule slippages, the climate became ripe for MILSTAR to be 
restructured or even terminated. 
Table 3 
MILSTAR Funding, FYs 1987-1989 
1987 1988 1989 
$468,357 M (Appro.) $384,779 M (Cost) $272,778 M (Cost) 
[Endnotes 28,29,33] 
The following charts (Figures 1 & 2) illustrate and show a 
contrasting of funding levels in current year dollars for MILSTAR and total 
DOD RDT&E resources for FYs 1982-1989. The MILSTAR chart shows a rise 
and fall of funding, as early congressional support is evident through FY 1987. 
Congressional skepticism and concern are shown in FYs 1988 and 1989 as 
funds for MILSTAR take a significant downturn in response to this 
congressional oversight. This is in contrast to the RDT&E amounts over the 
same period, as there is a gradual increase of funding throughout these years. 
This gives an indication of the problems that the MILSTAR program was 
facing as cost overruns, schedule slippages, and a questionable mission 
purpose all contributed to the marked reduction in the program's 
funding,despite significant congressional support for defense RDT&E 
programs in general. 
The next chapter will focus on the fiscal years 1990-1995 and 
examine how the MILSTAR program became an item of significant 
congressional interest as congressional oversight brought to view the 
mismatch of the world's security environment with the MILSTAR mission. 
This chapter will also examine DOD's response to this congressional 
oversight and give the current status for the MILSTAR program through the 
FY 1995 authorization and appropriations process. 
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MILSTAR Funding, FYs 1982-1989 
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DOD RDT&E Funding, FYs 1982-1989 
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V. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT OF MILSTAR - 
PROGRAM RESTRUCTURING AND REVITALIZATION (FYs 1990- 
1995) 
In FYs 1990-1991, the Defense Committees exercised a wide range of 
congressional oversight powers as MILSTAR's acquisition problems of cost, 
schedule, and performance came to the forefront. During these fiscal years, 
major program changes, along with congressional directions and restrictions, 
forced DOD to assess and re-evaluate MILSTAR's roles, requirements, and 
mission. Through FYs 1992-1995, MILSTAR gained a new life and began to 
once again give a favorable impression to Congress for its military utility and 
effectiveness. The following sections will examine this critical six-year period 
of MILSTAR and focus on how Congress, through oversight of the DOD 
budget, altered and significantly re-shaped the MILSTAR program. 
A.       RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILSTAR PROGRAM, FYs 1990-1991 
1. FY 1990 Funding 
FY 1990 marked the first year that congressional deliberations on 
MILSTAR were on center stage for oversight of military acquisition programs. 
It was the first year of MILSTAR where DOD felt the true impact of this 
congressional oversight as the program came under intense scrutiny. As 
MILSTAR's mission became more "blurry" with each new story of 
communism's demise, Members of Congress with agendas of less defense 
spending began to see the MILSTAR program as a prime target for 
termination.  Funding for MILSTAR in FY 1990 reflected this skepticism. 
The House Armed Services Committee did not address MILSTAR in 
its version of the National Defense Authorization Act, nor did it specify 
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MILSTAR funding. The Senate Armed Services Committee did address the 
program in its authorization and expressed its concern over the Air Force not 
meeting requirements for MILSTAR on-orbit satellites and spares due to 
"funding limits." This discrepancy was in contrast to the President's National 
Space Program Report which asserted that MILSTAR would be the only 
means of meeting the Air Force commitment to the strategic force 
management task. DOD leaders had argued in repeated testimony and budget 
justifications to Congress that MILSTAR was critical to strategic and 
conventional operations. The SASC thus did not accept "funding limits" as a 
rationale for DOD not adhering to the acknowledged MILSTAR requirements. 
This weak rationale by DOD further intensified Congress' MILSTAR 
oversight.  [Endnote 1, p. 73] 
Due in part to these conflicting approaches to MILSTAR program 
management from DOD, the SASC directed the Secretary of Defense to 
provide a report to the Defense Committees in the Senate and the House. 
This report was to address the probabilities, assumptions, and methodology 
that DOD would use in determining the likelihood that the planned 
MILSTAR constellation would provide the required area coverage for critical 
communications. Required annual funding was also to be included in this 
report. Neither the bill nor the report accompanying it that were reported out 
by the SASC for FY 1990 showed any MILSTAR funding authorized. [Endnote 
Lp. 73] 
In conference, the authorizing committees cut $88.2 million from the 
MILSTAR budget request, which was not revealed. No rationale was given in 
this conference report to explain this funding cut. This mark-down was not 
too surprising, given that major schedule slippages, significant cost overruns, 
and an increasingly antiquated mission became the key identifiers of the 
MILSTAR program.  [Endnote 2, p. 498] 
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The House Appropriations Committee in its defense appropriations 
bill did not address MILSTAR's primary budget category. It did however, 
provide the first real signs of MILSTAR's potential termination, as the full 
committee recommended program termination after the launch of the third 
satellite. Moreover, former Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney had to 
defend MILSTAR to the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee when 
it recommended a cut of $632 million from the program. Secretary Cheney 
stated that "termination now, or after three satellites, would severely impact 
strategic and tactical communications capabilities of the United States well 
into the future" [Endnote 6]. Another indication of MILSTAR's troubles was 
evident in that approximately $99 million was reduced by the HAC from the 
Air Force's request of $103.386 million for MILSTAR terminals. [Endnotes 3, 
5: p. 168, p. 60] 
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the full 
requested amount for MILSTAR terminals; however, classified language in 
the Senate's version directed certain required program changes to occur if 
MILSTAR were to continue.   [Endnotes 4, 5: p. 217, p. 60] 
The Conference Report for the Appropriations Committee most 
completely summarized congressional oversight of MILSTAR for FY 1990. 
House and Senate reports, along with accompanying classified annexes, 
characterized MILSTAR as a program plagued by poor definition of 
requirements, benign neglect by senior government officials, overly 
ambitious technical challenges, inadequate planning, contractor cost 
overruns, and repeated schedule slippages. MILSTAR though, would not be 
terminated. [Endnote 5, p. 59] 
The Conference Committee explained in its report that if the mission 
of MILSTAR were less critical to the surviving and enduring 
communications architecture necessary for support of U. S. national security, 
there  would  have been less  support  for program  continuation.     The 
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Committee expressed its view that if MILSTAR were terminated, the expense 
to begin development of a new system would exceed the costs of salvaging 
and restructuring MILSTAR.  [Endnote 5, p. 60] 
The conferees reluctantly declined termination of MILSTAR after the 
third satellite, but it was agreed to significantly restructure the program by 
eliminating $226.346 million from the FY 1990 DOD request. The Committee 
prohibited the acquisition of satellite number four and long-lead items for 
satellite number five, delayed launch of the first satellite by at least a year, 
denied all funds for Army terminals, and deleted half of the resources for Air 
Force terminals. In addition, a classified annex to the Committee's report 
gave definitive and non-negotiable program direction for MILSTAR, 
proscribing work beyond the third satellite without complete compliance to 
these directions.  [Endnote 5, p. 60] 
The FY 1990 budget request for MILSTAR is not listed in any of the 
authorization or appropriation acts. However, the FY 1991 National Defense 
Authorization Act from the HASC reveals the previous authorized amount 
for MILSTAR in FY 1990 as $400 million [Endnote 7, p. 163]. Program 
directions from the Congress may have been followed by DOD, as MILSTAR 
costs for FY 1990 in the U. S. Weapons Systems Costs manual also reflected 
$400 million [Endnote 8, p. B-16]. Congressional Members appeared to have 
been satisfied by the program's gradual restructuring and thus were 
convinced to retain the program. 
The congressional oversight of MILSTAR for FY 1990, keen and 
scrutinizing as it was, became even more critical in FY 1991, as the MILSTAR 
program went on the "chopping block." The next section will discuss FY 1991, 
as this was the linchpin year in which congressional oversight of MILSTAR 
would either terminate the program or make sweeping changes to restructure 
it. 
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2. FY 1991 Funding 
With the short breath of life breathed into MILSTAR in FY 1990, DOD 
increased its MILSTAR budget request to $744,164 million in FY 1991 [Endnote 
7, p. 163]. This optimistic jump from the previous fiscal year would be 
overshadowed by the vigorous congressional oversight from the Defense 
Committees. This amount was totally erased, as recommendations for 
MILSTAR's termination echoed in the halls of Congress again. 
Polar differences about MILSTAR were shown this fiscal year during 
the authorization and appropriations process. The House Armed Services 
Committee supported the program, as it recognized the importance of 
MILSTAR and recommended the full requested amount. The Committee 
had noticed that 70 per cent of the system's capacity would be devoted to 
tactical uses. The degree of tactical application of MILSTAR's capabilities 
would prove to be a key factor in congressional debate on the program's 
future. Rationale for the HASC's support relied in part on DOD's position 
that MILSTAR was its highest priority communications program and that 
DOD leaders had repeatedly validated MILSTAR's requirements since its 
inception in 1981.  [Endnote 7, pp. 171-172] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee however, stated a totally 
opposite view and discussed its reasoning in detail. It recommended 
termination of the program and thus denied all funds requested for 
MILSTAR. The SASC's reasoning was that in the context of a severe budget 
squeeze and the declining threat of a nuclear war, DOD had not justified the 
extraordinary expense of MILSTAR's over-designed system for a protracted 
strategic nuclear warfighting mission. Moreover, the committee questioned 
MILSTAR's utility for tactical applications and repeated concern regarding the 
program's continuing delays and cost increases.  [Endnote 9, p. 110] 
59 
The decision to terminate MILSTAR was also based on the committee's 
view that current and future U. S. command, control, and communications 
(C3) capabilities, were sufficiently robust and redundant to allow MILSTAR's 
cancellation and subsequent research into lower-cost alternatives. [Endnote 
9, p. 110] 
Certain fundamental questions of the SASC were also not satisfactorily 
answered by DOD. These questions were related to MILSTAR's requirements, 
affordability, and operational utility, and its priority in relation to other 
defense needs in the restricted budget and declining threat environments. 
Some of these questions were: Is $40 billion in investment in new and 
improved C3 systems since 1980 insufficient to provide an assured means of 
retaliation?; What are the added features of MILSTAR that would justify the 
expenditure of an additional $35-40 billion for this system alone?; Is 
MILSTAR an appropriate and cost-effective communications system for our 
tactical conventional forces?, and Does MILSTAR provide useful 
communication capabilities to actual fighting forces such as tactical fighter 
squadrons and ground maneuver units? These questions were very tough, 
but very logical in their approach.   [Endnote 9, p. 110] 
The committee could not discuss certain MILSTAR costs, as these were 
still classified. It did note that MILSTAR's annual operating expenses, after a 
ten-satellite constellation was established, would approach or exceed $1 
billion. Based on this information, it was expected that MILSTAR's 20-year 
life cycle costs would be in the range of $35-40 billion. The committee was 
also aware that the Air Force, in evaluating MILSTAR against other priorities, 
had recommended to Secretary of Defense Cheney to terminate MILSTAR. 
Secretary Cheney did not accept the recommendation, but this further 
weakened DOD's position in testimony and briefings for program justification 
to Congress.  [Endnote 9, p. Ill] 
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MILSTAR's nuclear warfighting mission was in serious doubt as the 
SASC reasoned with former President Reagan that a nuclear war could not be 
won and it should not be fought. The question for the committee then was: 
what is the justification for spending $35-40 billion for extended nuclear 
warfighting? With MILSTAR nearly five years behind schedule, several 
billions over cost, and initial and full operational capability years away, there 
seemed to be no justifiable reason for MILSTAR's continuation. The 
committee also justified its recommendation by citing the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
1990 Joint Military Assessment, which stated that, "the risk of nuclear 
deterrence failing is assessed to be low and at this moment to be decreasing." 
[Endnote 9, pp. 111-112] 
The committee did discuss tactical applications using EHF satellites, 
but with MILSTAR built for a nuclear environment, it did not seem 
applicable for conventional use. The SASC's overriding rationale for 
program termination was that there were higher defense priorities than 
MILSTAR in the constrained budget environment [Endnote 9, p. 110]. The 
committee concluded its discussion by authorizing $20 million for 
examination of an alternative program or programs to MILSTAR. [Endnote 
9, p. 114] 
The views of the HASC and the SASC were meshed together as the 
Conference Committee for Authorizations directed the Secretary of Defense 
to terminate MILSTAR altogether, or develop a plan for a system in place of 
the current MILSTAR system. This new system could either be a restructured 
MILSTAR or an alternative advanced satellite communications system. 
These directions had three objectives: (1) substantially reducing the cost of the 
program compared to the present cost; (2) increasing the utility of the 
program for tactical forces; and (3) eliminating unnecessary capabilities for 
protracted nuclear warfighting missions and operations. It also directed that 
no more than $600 million could be obligated or expended for MILSTAR or 
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its proposed alternative.    The final authorization was $500 million for an 
alternative system to the current MILSTAR system.    [Endnote 10, p. 28, 524] 
The House Appropriations Committee did not discuss MILSTAR 
specifically, but it denied the full requested amount for MILSTAR and did not 
appropriate any funds for an alternative system [Endnote 11, p. 219]. The 
Senate Appropriations Committee also denied the full requested amount, but 
it agreed with the SASC and appropriated $20 million for a MILSTAR 
alternative [Endnote 12, p. 221]. 
The Conference Committee for Appropriations however, concluded 
that a valid requirement existed for a surviving and robust EHF 
communications system to support varied national security functions. The 
committee also stated that while the MILSTAR program had suffered from 
unacceptable management and cost problems, it believed that the program 
had achieved significant improvements in managerial direction and cost 
containment. Moreover, the committee stated termination and development 
of a new system would eventually cost more than restructuring the 
MILSTAR program itself.  [Endnote 13, p. 97] 
The Conference Committee concluded by limiting the MILSTAR 
constellation to no more than six satellites and directing that this 
constellation should emphasize communications connectivity for tactical 
contingencies. MILSTAR terminals were also directed to accentuate tactical 
uses. General guidance was given that when possible, every effort should be 
made to ensure that MILSTAR would meet strategic nuclear connectivity 
requirements. The committee's final direction was that starting in FY 1992, 
the full cost of the MILSTAR system should be included as an unclassified 
part of the DOD budget. [Endnote 13, p. 97] 
This congressional oversight significantly changed the MILSTAR 
mission. Given these options, DOD chose to restructure the program. It 
lowered costs by reducing the constellation to six satellites as directed, reduced 
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the quantity of other ground-based equipment, and eliminated several system 
nuclear survivability features. To provide greater utility to tactical forces, 
DOD added a medium-data rate capability for the fourth satellite and beyond 
[Endnote 14, p. 6]. 
The final appropriated amount for FY 1991 is not specifically listed. 
However, the U. S. Weapons Costs manual for 1990 does list MILSTAR's 
main category cost as $744.164 million, the same as the requested amount 
[Endnote 8, p. B-16]. In this changeover, it appears that MILSTAR had gained 
credibility and was allowed to use the full requested amount to restructure 
the program. 
Table 4 
MILSTAR Funding, FYs 1990-1991 
1990 
$400 M (Cost) 
1991 
$744.164 M (Cost) 
(Endnote 8) 
B.        REVITALIZATION OF THE MILSTAR PROGRAM, FYs 1992-1995 
1. FYs 1992-1994 Funding 
a.  A New MILSTAR, FY 1992 Funding 
DOD restructured and thus revitalized the MILSTAR program in 
accordance with congressional direction. This restructuring reduced costs, 
increased the use to tactical users, and eliminated enduring nuclear 
warfighting capabilities. The House Armed Services Committee stated in its 
version of the defense authorization act that this new restructured program 
would reduce life-cycle costs by 25 per cent [Endnote 15, pp. 154-155]. 
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This new confidence in DOD by Congress more than likely 
contributed to the largest MILSTAR request yet. DOD requested $901,263 
million in its FY 1992 budget. The HASC authorized the full amount as 
MILSTAR's revised mission for more tactical applications satisfied 
congressional defense leaders of its new and effective mission. [Endnote 15, p. 
148] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee indicated in its bill that 
it was pleased by the progress that DOD had made in restructuring MILSTAR. 
This committee also approved the full requested amount [Endnote 17, p. 450]. 
Congressional oversight had not necessarily been relaxed, as the SASC gave 
instructions that it should be informed as soon as DOD decided how it would 
allocate MDR capacity to satellites four and beyond, and in what orbits 
satellites two and three would be placed. A Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) update was required of DOD to show the changes that would be made 
to MILSTAR as a result of the restructuring. MILSTAR had new credibility, 
but Congress was not going to lessen its attention on a program known for its 
volatility. The Conference Committee agreed with the House and Senate 
versions, and also approved the full requested MILSTAR amount [Endnote 
16, p. 450]. 
The renewed confidence in MILSTAR carried over to the 
appropriations committees as the HAC and the SAC recommended the full 
requested amount [Endnotes 18, 19: p. 211, p. 312]. This rejuvenation of 
MILSTAR was also affected by testimony from DOD officials on how 
MILSTAR could have enhanced U. S. communications capabilities during 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Due to these positive aspects, former 
congressional opponents of MILSTAR did a complete turn-around and began 
supporting it. [Endnote 20, pp. 441-442] 
The Conference Committee Report on Appropriations did not 
specifically list MILSTAR funding.     However, the  1993 U.  S.  Weapons 
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Systems Costs manual lists FY 1992 MILSTAR costs as $886.146 million 
[Endnote 21, p. B-17]. The leap in MILSTAR funding showed that Congress 
had been satisfied by DOD's restructuring and that the expanded scope to 
include tactical forces proved to be the key capability that convinced 
congressional Members of MILSTAR's effectiveness for new and different 
military contingencies. 
b. FYs 1993-1994 Funding 
These two fiscal years were generally silent on the main funding 
category for MILSTAR. The House version of the FY 1993 Defense 
Authorization Act lists the main MILSTAR category, but it showed that there 
was no DOD request for this budget line. There was a request for 
approximately $1.261 billion in a different, but similar budget line for 
development of Air Force MILSTAR terminals. The Senate version, in its 
discussion of EHF satellite communications, noted that the $1.261 billion 
requested included funds for RDT&E of MILSTAR terminals, along with 
satellites. It appeared that funds for terminal and satellite development were 
meshed together under program element #33601F for FY 1993. The House 
authorized the full amount under this budget line, while the Senate reduced 
the amount to $1.240 billion. Congressional oversight was still evident, as the 
SASC directed the Secretary of Defense to inform the committee prior to any 
of his final decisions regarding the MILSTAR program. [Endnotes 22, 23: p. 
135, p. 117,121] 
The Conference Committee concurred with the Senate version 
and authorized $1.240 billion for RDT&E of MILSTAR under this inclusive 
budget line. This committee exercised its oversight, as it directed the Air 
Force to select only one contractor to complete procurement of the command 
post terminal program [Endnote 24, p. 607, 614].  The Conference Committee's 
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most significant oversight though, was its directive for the Secretary of 
Defense to develop a comprehensive acquisition strategy aimed at reducing 
costs and increasing efficiencies for the development, fielding, and operation 
of DOD space programs. As a result of this directive, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence approved 
a further reduction in MILSTAR's planned constellation from six to four 
satellites [Endnote 14, p. 6]. 
The House Appropriations Committee approved the full budget 
request of $1.261 billion. This amount was also listed under the RDT&E 
budget line for Air Force terminals [Endnote 25, p. 199]. The Senate 
Appropriations Committee reduced the requested amount to $1.195 billion 
and the Conference Committee settled on $1.211 billion for appropriation 
[Endnote 26, p. 134]. There was no discussion of MILSTAR in these latter 
appropriation bills. 
Although it is not clear on exact funding for the main MILSTAR 
segment, the resources made available to the overall MILSTAR program 
show strong congressional support. This backing from Congress had its price, 
as congressional oversight in FY 1993 remained very detailed. However, the 
program progressed into FY 1994 and maintained strong funding support. 
As in FY 1993, DOD requested funds for MILSTAR in FY 1994 
under the new terminal development budget line (#33601F). This request 
was for $973.162 million. No funds were requested under the main 
MILSTAR program element #33603F. The House Armed Services 
Committee authorized this full amount in its authorization bill [Endnote 27, 
p. 141]. The Senate version did not discuss or list MILSTAR funding, but 
support for the program was still evident as the SASC discussed its concern 
that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was developing a new 
EHF communications waveform that might not be compatible with the 
MILSTAR system.   The SASC directed the BMDO to ensure that if this new 
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waveform was not developed in time for deployment on the first or second 
MILSTAR MDR satellites (#3&4), then it would be implemented to ensure 
backward compatibility with existing MILSTAR satellites and terminals 
[Endnote 28, p. 82]. No SASC changes were revealed on the FY 1994 request, 
but in conference, the House and Senate deleted $50 million from the request 
to authorize $923.162 million [Endnote 29, p. 76]. 
The House Appropriations Committee deleted $100 million 
from the budget request, but did not discuss the MILSTAR program in detail 
[Endnote 30, p. 250]. The Senate Appropriations Committee did discuss 
MILSTAR as it deleted $22.1 million from the budget request. The SAC 
directed that no reallocation of MILSTAR funds for the Air Force in FY 1994 
could occur without consultation and notification to the Committee [Endnote 
31, p. 306]. In conference, the HAC and the SAC deleted $41.162 million and 
made a final appropriation of $932 million [Endnote 32, p. 92]. The following 
table shows MILSTAR funding under its main budget category and the 
terminal category where most funding occurred for FYs 1993-1994. 
Table 5 
MILSTAR Funding, FYs 1992-1994 
1992 1993 1994 
$886.146 M (Cost) $1.211 B (Inclusive) $932 M (Inclusive) 
(Endnotes 21, 26, 32) 
At this point, MILSTAR was on strong footing, but at the 
expense of keen congressional oversight. The program still had its 
congressional opponents, as FY 1995 was marked by MILSTAR again taking a 
center stage and generating significant congressional interest and debate. 
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2. Recent MILSTAR Oversight, FY 1995 Funding 
DOD requested $607,248 million for research and development of 
MILSTAR in FY 1995. The program had been restructured to adapt to the new 
security environment, but it still retained some important features from its 
Cold War origin and it relied on the costly Titan IV launch vehicle. These 
areas renewed the MILSTAR debate as congressional opponents again 
emphasized MILSTAR's "Cold War" features and high costs in deliberating 
the program's usefulness.  [Endnote 14, p. 5] 
The House Armed Services Committee noted in its authorization bill 
that the advanced EHF satellite (MILSTAR III) had advanced technologies 
that MILSTARs I & II could not incorporate, and that it could use a less 
expensive medium launch vehicle. The committee stated its belief that the 
development of MILSTAR III, which was to be a follow-on to MILSTAR II, 
should be accelerated so that it could be deployed early in the next decade and 
thus negate acquisition of MILSTAR satellites 5 and 6. [Endnotes 14, 33: p. 6, 
p. 116] 
The HASC recommended the full requested amount for MILSTAR and 
also recommended $35 million for the advanced EHF satellite program. The 
committee specified that of the $607.248 million, $12 million could be used for 
either long lead funding for MILSTAR II satellites 5 and 6, or to further 
accelerate the advanced EHF program. Congressional oversight again took 
the form of a restriction on funds until DOD delivered plans on how these 
funds would be spent. [Endnote 33, p. 116] 
The HASC further exercised oversight as it directed the Secretary of 
Defense to develop a military communications master plan. The committee 
was concerned that the military satellite communications structure was 
fragmented and that DOD was remaining isolated from the advances made by 
the commercial telecommunications industry.     Military communications 
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authority and responsibility were also questioned as the committee was 
concerned that a serious gap existed between those agencies who established 
communications requirements, and those who paid for them. Appropriate 
interservice funding support for military acquisition programs was seen as a 
key improvement for DOD to accomplish in managing joint programs. The 
House authorization bill also prohibited the obligation of $50 million until 
DOD submitted the communications master plan to the committee.   [Endnote 
33, p. 116] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its authorization bill, 
addressed MILSTAR's history and restructuring. The SASC cited the 1993 
Bottom-Up Review (BUR) conducted by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, 
which reaffirmed the need for MILSTAR despite its high costs. The BUR 
concluded that the technologies needed for replacing MILSTAR with a 
cheaper satellite (MILSTAR III) were not mature enough to accelerate 
appreciably and that DOD could not wait another ten years for jam-resistant 
satellite communications. The BUR, however, did advocate this advanced 
satellite program. This newer and more advanced satellite would replace 
MILSTAR II by FY 2006. The SASC agreed that the BUR examined the right 
issues and  the committee subsequently accepted the BUR findings.   [Endnote 
34, pp. 122-123] 
The SASC, however, did direct DOD to assess the GAO report that 
asserted that DOD could accelerate the advanced EHF satellite by at least 
several years at acceptable risk. This was the same report whose findings the 
HASC had accepted. These findings stated that DOD could forgo acquisition 
of the last two MILSTAR satellites and thus save $2 billion [Endnote 14, p. 7]. 
This assessment was to be submitted to the congressional defense committees. 
[Endnote 34, p. 123] 
Despite the new possibilities of an advanced satellite system, the SASC 
expressed its view that MILSTAR's jam-resistant communications were very 
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important to tactical forces and that no near-term alternative to MILSTAR 
could provide this capability. The committee further stated that MILSTAR 
would have been canceled if not for the support of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Army, the Navy, and the CINCs.   [Endnote 34, p. 123] 
Concern for the lead service involved in the MILSTAR acquisition was 
also raised as the SASC noted that the Air Force had sought to terminate 
MILSTAR due to its lesser role in Air Force missions. After the restructuring, 
the Army and Navy became strong MILSTAR supporters as the tactical 
applications of MILSTAR enhanced these services' communications 
capabilities. The Air Force sought MILSTAR's termination, even as it 
continued to argue that it should be the lead service for all space-related 
acquisition programs. In response to this, the SASC recommended a 
provision in its bill that would have given management of MILSTAR to the 
Navy. This issue was discussed in the Conference Report. It was determined 
that the conferees would withhold judgement, since DOD had this issue 
under review and was considering making a fundamental change in 
MILSTAR's management [Endnote 35, p. 626]. The Air Force remained the 
lead service for MILSTAR's acquisition.   [Endnote 34, p. 123] 
The SASC concluded its discussion of MILSTAR by addressing satellite 
communications in general, directing DOD to submit a report on future plans 
on DOD's use of advanced EHF communications, how satellite 
communications would affect and incorporate mobile, battlefield users and 
how DOD would optimize use of satellites and fiber-optic communications. 
Congressional oversight was not lessening, but the SASC did authorize the 
full $607.248 million requested for FY 1995.   [Endnotes 34, 35: p. 124, p. 590] 
The authorizing conferees approved the full request of $607.248 
million. Section 234 of the authorization act indicates that of the amount 
authorized, $20 million was to be available for either advance procurement of 
MILSTAR satellites five and six, or for the Advanced EHF satellite program. 
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The Conference Committee also directed that the required satellite 
communications master plan from DOD discuss projected military satellite 
communications requirements, alternate and innovative ways of meeting 
these requirements, and possible financial incentives to ensure that those in 
the DOD who require communications are involved in the funding of 
acquiring those communications.  [Endnote 35, p. 38] 
The House Appropriations Committee agreed with the HASC and 
appropriated the $607.248 million. The committee also appropriated $35 
million for the Advanced EHF program. These funds for MILSTAR and the 
Advanced EHF were transferred to the RDT&E Defense-Wide account, and 
not provided in the Air Force RDT&E budget line as had been previously 
done [Endnote 36, pp. 252-253, 260]. The Senate Appropriations Committee 
did not discuss MILSTAR, but it also appropriated the full $607.248 million 
[Endnote 37, p. 299]. Thus the MILSTAR program "sailed" through FY 1995, 
as the Conference Committee continued MILSTAR's support with the full 
appropriation for DOD's budget request.   [Endnote 38, p. H9645] 
MILSTAR's support in Congress increased in FY 1995 even under keen 
congressional oversight. This oversight was again very detailed. DOD was 
directed to fully inform Congress of its future satellite communications plans, 
as the past problems and recent successes of MILSTAR motivated Defense 
Committee Members to more objectively ascertain military acquisition 
programs before giving their support. The MILSTAR satellite's new 
communications applicability for tactical forces was a major factor that 
convinced congressional Members of the satellite's enhanced effectiveness for 
future military conflicts. Given the increased concern and awareness of the 
American people for the care and safety of their service personnel, 
MILSTAR's new mission convinced Members of Congress to back this 
significant improvement in our nation's military capabilities.   The following 
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Charts (Figures 3&4), depict MILSTAR funding for FYs 1990-1995 in current 
year dollars, and compare this to the DOD RDT&E budget for the same period. 
MILSTAR funding for these fiscal years shows a correlation to DOD 
RDT&E funding, as MILSTAR's renewed support is part of the overall 
congressional support that is given DOD-wide for RDT&E programs. This 
would indicate that a program like MILSTAR has good backing, but funding 
levels appear to be dependent on the overall trend of support that Congress is 
giving DOD for programs still in R&D phases. 
The next and final chapter will address the impacts that congressional 
oversight has had on the MILSTAR program, and discuss recommendations 
for further research on the impacts of congressional oversight on military 
acquisition programs. 
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Figure 3 
MILSTAR Funding, FYs 1990-1995 
(Endnotes 8, 21, 26, 32, 38 ) 
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Figure 4 
DOD RDT&E Funding, FYs 1990-1995 
(Endnotes 38, 39) 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COMMITTEES 
1. Fiscal Years 1982-1989 
The early years of MILSTAR, (FYs 1982-1986), were characterized by 
strong congressional funding. In its first appearance in the DOD budget, the 
authorizing and appropriating committees made reference in their respective 
bills to MILSTAR's capabilities and expectations for strategic communications 
during a nuclear war. The DOD request for MILSTAR was increased, as an 
additional $38 million was authorized and appropriated for the program. At 
this point, MILSTAR enjoyed good standing with the four Defense 
Committees. 
This good standing continued for the next three fiscal years, as each 
annual DOD request for MILSTAR was fully authorized and appropriated. 
This period also revealed the first indicators of congressional concern as the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees raised issues about certain 
problems such as communications interoperability and schedule slippages. 
These matters not withstanding, the authorizing committees presented 
themselves as strong advocates of MILSTAR. 
The appropriating committees generally followed their respective 
authorizing committees in support of MILSTAR. As "guardians of the purse" 
though, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees could be expected 
to cast a more "wary" eye at high-cost programs, no matter what their stated 
purpose. This was the case in FY 1985, as the SAC voiced concern with 
MILSTAR's non-disclosure of costs. The SAC did appropriate the full 
requested amount, as MILSTAR was still "riding" the wave of military 
spending enthusiasm.  This first probing of MILSTAR's costs in FY 1985 could 
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have marked the beginning where the appropriating committees started to 
take a closer look at MILSTAR since its full costs were not revealed due to the 
program's security classification. 
Fiscal Years 1987-1989 can be identified as the period when the four 
Defense Committees began to vary slightly in their views of MILSTAR. This 
could have been attributed to the slow but sure ending of the Cold War with 
the Soviet Union. These differing views were reflected in FY 1987 as this was 
the first year where the MILSTAR request from DOD was reduced. The 
defense authorizing committees made the first cuts and in conference deleted 
$25 million from DOD's request. 
The views from the authorizers did not carry over to the defense 
appropriating subcommittees. The Defense Subcommittee of the HAC 
recommended the full requested amount. Its counterpart in the Senate 
however, agreed with the authorizers and cut $25 million. The final 
appropriation for this year was reduced by the same amount. This was 
MILSTAR's biggest budget to date, as the end of Communism and the Soviet 
Union "widened the doors" for Congress to re-evaluate where the nation's 
dollars were being spent. 
The last two fiscal years of 1988 and 1989 showed reduced dollars for 
MILSTAR, as its mission and purpose were called into question. The defense 
authorization and appropriation bills from the Defense Committees for these 
two years were silent on MILSTAR. The program was about to enter a period 
of intense debate. MILSTAR opposition emerged from various congressional 
Members and the debate was probably no less involved in the Defense 
Committees. 
Although the Defense Committees at varying times had slightly 
different views on how much to fund MILSTAR, these four committees were 
generally in agreement. Given MILSTAR's increasing, but not fully disclosed 
costs, and the historical developments throughout the former Soviet bloc, 
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MILSTAR was a program that lent itself to opposition. The American public 
saw a newer world evolving as preparations for war began to take a lesser 
place in the nation's priorities; members of Congress reflected these public 
views. Programs similar to MILSTAR thus became prime targets for 
termination. 
DOD no doubt also foresaw world events and the implications for its 
roles and missions, and particularly for military acquisition programs. The 
DOD had to conduct internal reevaluations and work with the Defense 
Committees to keep programs such as MILSTAR alive. This cooperation 
enabled DOD to sustain MILSTAR through a turbulent period of changing 
military missions and responsibilities. This cooperation would later prove to 
be very beneficial as the early fiscal years of the 1990's were marked by the 
fiercest debate on the MILSTAR program and key supporters in the Defense 
Committees would emerge to help keep the program going. 
2. Fiscal Years 1990-1995 
The early fiscal years of this period were marked by sharp contrasts 
among the Defense Committees on the fate of MILSTAR. MILSTAR's high 
costs and schedule slippages had significantly increased congressional 
oversight and made even strong supporters of DOD programs more critical in 
their MILSTAR inquiries. 
In FY 1990, the HASC and the SASC deleted funds from DOD's request 
for MILSTAR, as DOD was trying to manage a joint acquisition program 
through only one of the Services, which caused internal conflicts in DOD. 
This management problem sent mixed signals to Congress as outwardly DOD 
fought hard for MILSTAR, but inwardly DOD's program organization led to 
budget reductions for MILSTAR from the lead service. This further 
intensified Congress' skepticism of the program. 
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This mixed signal was very evident as the Appropriation Committees 
exercised their congressional oversight very differently. The Defense 
Subcommittee of the HAC recommended termination of MILSTAR after its 
third satellite. The SAC did not recommend termination, but did direct 
certain program changes. In conference, the Appropriation Committees did 
not terminate MILSTAR, but did direct some program restructuring. 
FY 1991 was the key year for MILSTAR as the program was restructured 
through actions by the Defense Committees. Completely contrasting views 
were very apparent as the HASC recommended the full budget request for 
MILSTAR, but the SASC recommended'program termination. Newer and 
lower cost alternatives to MILSTAR had been introduced to Congress and this 
created a competition for congressional satellite communications support. 
Differing views of the authorizing committees were reconciled in conference, 
resulting in directions to DOD to terminate MILSTAR or restructure it. 
Neither the HAC nor the SAC appropriated funds for MILSTAR. In 
conference though, the conferees agreed that the MILSTAR program had 
made significant improvements in cost containment and management. Thus 
funds were appropriated for MILSTAR to continue, but with very specific 
directions for program management and restructuring. 
Through these two crucial years, each Defense Committee reflected a 
separate pattern of support for and opposition to MILSTAR. The authorizers 
and appropriators did not appear to consistently follow their committee 
counterpart in the opposite House. MILSTAR's debate approached the limits 
of the range of problems and issues and this broad spectrum contributed to 
the varied support and opposition from the Defense Committees. 
In FYs 1992-1994, the Defense Committees returned to unanimity in 
support of MILSTAR. Their only deviations were their varying forms and 
degrees of oversight. MILSTAR's restructuring had convinced the Defense 
Committees of its new utility and effectiveness for post-Cold War military 
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conflicts. MILSTAR was on an advancing path, but its history had 
permanently attracted and increased congressional oversight for its future 
direction and management. 
Congressional oversight in FY 1995 did show a small, but somewhat 
significant variation from the previous three fiscal years, as an alternative to 
MILSTAR was presented once more. The main debate however, was again 
MILSTAR's purpose and its Cold War capabilities as congressional Members 
outside the Defense Committees sought the program's termination. 
Key congressional leaders such as Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), who was 
then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, defended 
MILSTAR against this old debate. Slightly different views between the 
committees were evident, as the HASC recommended funds for further 
research into a MILSTAR alternative, while the SASC determined that no 
plausible alternative would be available in time to replace all or part of 
MILSTAR. In conference, the authorizing committees recommended the full 
amount for MILSTAR and also recommended funds for more research into 
the alternative. 
The appropriating committees followed suit, as the total budget request 
for MILSTAR was appropriated along with funds for the alternative satellite 
system. These slight variations seemed to indicate that given new issues and 
problems, the Defense Committees could once again go in their own direction 
and give mixed, fragmented support for MILSTAR. As of this writing, 
MILSTAR is a viable program, but one which is likely to continue to 
experience intense congressional oversight from the Defense Committees. 
The major impact of the Defense Committees was that these 
committees, by virtue of their authority and power, significantly altered and 
restructured the MILSTAR program. This power was also exhibited as 
MILSTAR was almost terminated. The authorizing and appropriating 
committees exhibited their oversight powers rather equally for MILSTAR, 
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despite differing viewpoints. A factor that did stand out was that the 
appropriating committees would exercise as much or more oversight as the 
authorizing committees. DOD thus has two equally important committees in 
the appropriators to deal with. No consistent pattern was evident for 
committees who were for or against MILSTAR. 
DOD leaders must continue to seek improvements to strengthen DOD- 
congressional relations. The next section will discuss program management 
issues for DOD to consider in working with Congress, whose support must be 
continually earned. 
B.        IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ON DOD ACQUISITION 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
MILSTAR began as a high-profile acquisition program due to its 
unique mission, capabilities, and particularly its development and acquisition 
costs, which surpassed those of most other weapon systems programs. All 
major acquisition programs receive congressional oversight in one form or 
another. However, programs such as MILSTAR that are space-related, have 
unusually high costs, and are incorporating the limits of new and advanced 
technologies, immediately gain more attention than other more 
conventional acquisition programs for congressional oversight. MILSTAR 
also attracted unusual congressional attention because it was a joint 
acquisition program. Because the Services have a history of not working well 
together, Congress gave MILSTAR more scrutiny than it otherwise would 
have. 
DOD must be conscious of such considerations and seek consistent 
improvements for management of potentially volatile programs. These 
improvements should assist DOD leaders to better present these programs to 
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Congress so as to   improve confidence in DOD and lessen congressional 
oversight. 
A major factor in improving management of acquisition programs is 
for DOD to study how it can better structure the organization and funding of 
joint acquisition programs. One of the significant problems of MILSTAR 
which prompted congressional criticism was the fact that the lead Service, the 
Air Force, reduced the MILSTAR budget request while DOD leaders were 
testifying to Congress of MILSTAR's importance and necessity. This 
communicated a very mixed signal to Congress. 
The Air Force funded the major portion of the MILSTAR program 
through its RDT&E budget line. This funding included common system 
requirements that applied to all the Services involved. The problem for the 
Air Force was that certain Service unique requirements, such as for the Army 
and Navy, were to be funded by the Air Force too. This placed the Air Force, 
the lead Service, in the untenable position of promoting both a joint program 
and its own Service-specific programs in a very constrained and competitive 
budget environment. 
DOD should re-examine the joint acquisition program organization to 
ensure a more unified management approach and to present military 
acquisition programs with "one voice" to the U. S. Congress. This should 
help to increase acquisition program success and reduce the degree of 
congressional oversight to a reasonable level. DOD can at times be its own 
worst enemy as its own management practices can draw more congressional 
oversight than required. 
The MILSTAR program has stood out as a program from which DOD 
has learned lessons and one from which more efficient and effective 
acquisition management practices can be developed. The challenge for DOD 
is to capitalize on these lessons learned and experiences to improve and thus 
present itself with more credibility to the U. S. Congress. 
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C        SUMMARY 
It is very evident that Congress, through the budget process, exercises a 
significant degree of authority in overseeing military acquisition programs. 
Future acquisition programs are likely to be even more risky and expensive, 
as new technologies and capabilities will create new programs and challenges 
for DOD acquisition officials and personnel. Given this potential aspect for 
future military acquisition programs, DOD can employ some lessons learned 
from the MILSTAR program to better prepare for its interactions with 
Congress. 
DOD should be more pro-active in assessing its on-going acquisition 
programs, so as to correctly match these programs to the latest threat during 
periods of fundamental change. MILSTAR was a program caught in the 
period of the demise of communism and the subsequent call from Congress 
for less defense spending. Given its original Cold War mission, the program 
attracted immediate attention as it maintained this original mission despite a 
changing threat. Congress, justifiably, responded to the MILSTAR program 
and made adjustments to reflect the new security environment. 
Currently, the U. S. Government has deficit reduction as a major issue 
to be resolved. Meanwhile, an unstable geo-political world is presenting an 
ambiguous threat for our nation's armed forces. DOD should assess which 
acquisition programs, if any, can be altered or even terminated to ensure that 
preparations for war and the nation's resources are optimized correctly. 
Beginning this process before Congress gets involved should help reduce 
unnecessary congressional oversight and give more credibility to DOD. 
DOD needs to also re-examine its joint acquisition management 
structure. It should fully integrate the resources and management from all 
the Services. The Air Force, the lead Service for MILSTAR, made budget 
reductions  to  the  program  due  to  the joint  management  structure  of 
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MILSTAR which did not properly allocate resources. Requirements from the 
other services were imposed, but no funding from the other Services was 
provided to support these requirements. DOD should consider new 
procedures for implementing joint acquisition programs which ensure that 
the Services that create the demand for system requirements have a 
corresponding role in paying for them. The impact of "jointness" can have 
significant consequences for acquisition programs as new and different 
problems require new and different management. 
There is evidence that DOD is beginning to recognize and address the 
issue of proper management of joint acquisition programs, particularly space- 
related ones. In a letter dated December 10, 1994, Deputy Defense Secretary 
John Deutch established the new Deputy Defense Undersecretary for Space 
Acquisition and Technology Programs (SA&TP) position. This new official is 
expected to consolidate all DOD space policy and acquisition responsibilities 
into one office, and serve as DOD's sole spokesperson for space when dealing 
with Congress and other government agencies. This should help remedy 
some of the problems that the MILSTAR program experienced.   [Endnote 1, p. 
50] 
Another position to emerge from this new SA&TP office would be the 
"Space Architect." This two-star flag officer is to be in charge of all resources 
for U. S. unified space organizations and be responsible for a strategic 
investment strategy and an integrated budget. This is a key responsibility, as 
MILSTAR did not have an integrated budget and there was no cohesive DOD 
space architecture from which to view and thus manage the MILSTAR 
program effectively. [Endnote 1, p. 50] 
This new DOD office, along with its high-profile positions, should help 
the defense department to present a cohesive position and develop an overall 
architecture for space. If the SA&TP office had been in existence during the 
critical periods of MILSTAR, it might have recognized the changing threat 
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sooner and thus restructured the program in a more timely manner, resolved 
budget problems more efficiently, and given DOD more credibility with 
Congress. 
The MILSTAR program also exhibited the unique challenge that DOD 
has in working with the four Defense Committees. Throughout the 
MILSTAR program, no one authorizing or appropriating committee 
demonstrated consistent support for or opposition to MILSTAR. Thus, DOD 
must work separately with each committee in presenting its acquisition 
programs and realize that satisfying the National Security Committee of the 
House does not guarantee the same result with the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. The composition of Members of a committee, rather than the 
function of the committee, is more than likely the major factor in assessing a 
committee's potential support. DOD should be aware of this when presenting 
briefings, submitting reports, and giving testimony to Congress. 
If anything, congressional oversight will probably increase and 
programs such as MILSTAR will find themselves at the center of 
congressional debate for the allocation of the nation's resources. This sets the 
challenge for DOD to improve its internal acquisition management, set 
realistic acquisition goals and objectives, and to seek innovative means to 
improve its working relationship with Congress. Striving to meet this 
challenge will help DOD to gain more credibility with the U. S. Congress as 
DOD leaders present and suggest better ways of managing acquisition 
programs, both in DOD and in conjunction with the Congress. This should 
improve the acquisition process as the Congress and the DOD work to equip 
our nation's armed forces with the best technology, given the realities of a 
restricted budget environment. 
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D.        RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Congressional budgetary oversight is a permanent fixture in military 
acquisition programs. With new technologies and innovations appearing 
more frequently in today's world, DOD leaders will be continually seeking 
new advancements to ensure that any future military conflict concludes with 
U. S. national security interests intact. This will require that the nation's 
armed forces have the best equipment and technology available to guarantee 
success. 
This places the burden on the front-end "players" of the DOD 
acquisition process. Given many different and competing demands for our 
nation's resources, Congress will continue to focus on DOD as a source of 
funds for deficit reduction and other national interests. Military acquisition 
programs may bear the brunt of such cuts, as these programs mostly only exist 
on paper and thus do not have a significant impact on current operations. 
Consequently, further research may be considered to help DOD leaders 
and acquisition officials to better manage acquisition programs and improve 
their relations with Congress.  The following areas may prove to be beneficial: 
1. Possible lessons learned from other high-profile, space-related 
programs such as MILSTAR should be examined for events that influenced 
congressional oversight through the budget process. 
2. DOD joint acquisition program management and organization 
should be reviewed for possible improvements. 
3. A cost/benefit analysis of total MILSTAR life-cycle costs should be 
conducted to determine whether savings were actually achieved by 
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